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Abstract 
 
This thesis is planned to investigate to what extent external finance premium 
channels by amplifying the business cycle account for the economy turndown in 
the UK. It builds a DSGE model follows Smets and Woulters (2007), extends to 
incorporate with the Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator 
mechanism and adjusts for an Armington (1969) version small open economy. 
We evaluation the model based on the calibration and re-estimate the model by 
Indirect Inference method using un-filtered nonstationary data in the period of 
1975Q1 to 2015Q4. The overall performance of modelling fitting after estimation 
increases with the model significantly pass the Indirect Inference test. The 
estimation results are also robust to the period from 1992Q4 to 2015Q4 under the 
inflation targeting monetary policy regime. Although the model captures the 
counter cyclical feature of external finance premium proposed in most of the 
literatures, external finance premium shocks on the financial sector do not play a 
dominate role in explaining a recession. The main dominant effects of output 
fluctuations are still coming from the non-financial shocks, in particular, the non-
stationary productivity shock and the labour supply shock. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 
The motivation behind this thesis is without doubts related to the recent financial 
crisis. The severity of the financial crisis and the Great Recession has prompted a 
reconsideration of its proximate origin in the financial sector. The initial economic 
crisis, which saw as a 7% peak to trough decline in output, has been followed by 
a prolonged period of low growth. Meanwhile, forecasts for GDP growth in the 
UK were revised downwards by the International Monetary Fund because of the 
severe effect of the global economic crisis on the UK financial sector. Unlike 
Eurozone, although there was much speculation of a ‘double dip’ recession that 
the UK economy’s recovery from the great recession had stalled during 2010s and 
early 2013, it turns out that the economy was under no such threat. Although the 
UK economy is now returning to sustained recovery, but there is some distance to 
make up after a sharp recession and a delayed return to growth. Figure 1 shows 
even after 12 consecutive quarters of growth from 2012 Q4 to 2015 Q4, the total 
UK output growth continued to be a ‘flat lining’ economy and remained below its 
pre-recession level. 
Figure 1.UK Real GDP, Quarter on Quarter change 
 
Source: Quarterly National Accounts, ONS, GDP (AMBI)  
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After the 2007 US financial crisis, a growing number of works focused their 
attention on the DSGE models incorporating with financial frictions. Until then, 
the prevailing literature framework to model financial frictions within dynamic 
models referred to Bernanke et al. (1999) financial accelerator. This kind of 
literature and its further extension such as Christiano et al. (2010) focused its 
attention mainly on the demand side of the credit market. Other authors have 
estimated DSGE models for the United Kingdom. Di Cecio and Nelson (2007) 
and Kamber and Millard (2012) use a ‘minimum distance’ estimation approach to 
estimate the Smets and Wouters (2007) model on UK data and Kamber and 
Millard (2012) also estimate a version of the Gertler et al. (2008) model, which 
extends the Smets and Wouters model to allow for search and matching frictions. 
More recently, Villa and Yang (2011) use Bayesian techniques to estimate a 
model on UK data that adds financial frictions to the Smets and Wouters model 
and Faccini et al. (2013) do the same for a model that adds labour market frictions. 
However, unlike the current model, these models are all ‘closed economy’ and so  
might not be thought of as the best models to use when considering the ‘open’ UK 
economy. To the best of my knowledge, there have been a few attempts to 
incorporate frictions in financial intermediaries in the open economy framework 
such as Harrison and Oomen (2010), Millard (2011) and Burgess et al. (2013) on 
UK data.  
 
The most critique of the current state of New Keynesian DSGE models is that 
these models lack an appropriate financial sector so that the models failed to 
account for an important source of aggregate fluctuations. This thesis is planned 
to investigate to what extent external finance premium channels by amplifying the 
business cycle account for the economy turndown in the UK. Chapter 2 is a review 
of theoretical and empirical literatures try to embed financial frictions in the 
framework of DSGE macroeconomics models. In particular, the review starts 
from the work of Bernanke et al. (1999), under the assumption of the costly state 
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verification approach introduced by Townsend (1979). It demonstrated that the 
amplification and persistence mechanism introduced by financial friction have an 
important role in business cycles. The model generates a so-called "financial 
accelerator" effect since endogenous pro-cyclical movement in entrepreneurial 
net worth magnify investment and output fluctuations. The review then extends 
to a collateral constraint approach by imposing restrictions based on the need to 
collateralize the loan to cover inability to fulfil obligations under a financial 
contract.  On the other hand, researchers such as Gertler and Karadi (2011), 
Gertler and Kyiotaki (2010), introduced an agency problem between banks and 
depositors that introduces endogenous constraints on intermediary leverage ratios 
that links the amounts of deposits to the net worth of the financial intermediary. 
We focus the attention on empirical contributions have as primary target to better 
understand the role played by financial frictions in the business cycle fluctuations.  
In chapter 3, it builds a DSGE model follows SW (2007). It is then extended to 
incorporate with the financial accelerator mechanism as in BGG (1999) and an 
Armington (1969) open economy version. The wage and price setting follows Le 
et al (2011)’s hybrid model assuming that wage and price setters find themselves 
supplying labour and intermediate output partly in a competitive market with price 
and wage flexibility, and partly in a market with imperfect competition. The 
closest empirical exercise to the model framework is contained in Le et al (2012, 
2013). Although this set-up does not explicitly model the banking system, the 
spread shock is suitable to capture the effect of financial tightening on 
entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity. A similar model framework (at least in the 
closed economy setup) has been adopted in numbers of studies (e.g. Gertler, 
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007); Christensen and Dib (2008); De Graeve (2008); 
Queijo von Heideken (2009), Gelain, (2010), Le et al (2012, 2013)). The results 
from IRFs are not at odds with those found in other studies that financial frictions 
affected the economy through financial transmission channels, by amplifying the 
business cycle.  
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With respect the confirmation of the empirical relevance of the financial frictions, 
in chapter 4, I test the model with calibrated parameters, and re-estimate the 
structural parameters and assess the role of different shock, in particular, financial 
shocks as the drivers of the variability delivers. However, chapter 4 differs other 
studies in several aspects. First, in contrast to conventional estimation techniques, 
I evaluate and estimate the proposed model by using the method of Indirect 
Inference. Secondly, the model is estimated against non-stationary data. Thirdly, 
observed sample period is extended to 2015Q4. The result shows model with or 
without financial frictions are severely rejected using calibrated parameters, while 
the overall performance of modelling fitting improved under the Indirect 
Inference estimation. The studies of variance and historical shock decomposition 
suggest although external finance premium and entrepreneurs’ net worth shock 
are the main drivers of financial variable fluctuations, they do not play a dominate 
role of capturing macroeconomic dynamics as the expansion and collapse of the 
economic activity. This is a remarkable result which somewhat highlights Le et al 
(2012, 2013)’s conclusion that the financial crisis was most likely the result of 
non-stationary shocks impacting through the usual non-financial channels. 
Moreover, with the introduction of external finance premium shock, investment 
shock is relegated to account for a small fraction of the variance in nominal 
variables and entrepreneurs’ net worth. Finally, chapter 5 concludes and discusses 
future possible applications and extensions of existing works. 
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Chapter 2 DSGE models with financial Frictions: A 
Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
 
The DSGE model encompasses a broad class of macroeconomic models that 
spans the standard neoclassical growth model in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). 
It then reaches a high level of sophistication with Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (2005) (henceforth CEE05), and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) 
(henceforth SW03, SW07). These DSGE models have become the workhorse 
framework that used not only for academic and policy analyses, but also for 
forecasting (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013). However, the failure of those 
DSGE models to predict the financial crisis 2007-2008 and aftermath Great 
Recession has rightly come under attack. The macroeconomic literature using 
DSGE models has modelled the financial sector mostly as a pass-through 
mechanism, not taking into account financial frictions and their role as amplifier 
of monetary policy decisions (Beck et al. 2014). The studies developed New 
Keynesian macroeconomic model that contains numerous real and nominal 
frictions, while assumptions of financial markets are smooth and perfect. 
The recent turmoil has provided impetus that a significant disruption of financial 
frictions has turned out to be a relevant factor for economic fluctuations. In 
particular, Del Negro et al. (2013) showed that an extension with several financial 
frictions to the SW07 model helps to forecast the US economy during the great 
recession (from 2008Q3) (it features a sharp decline in output without forecasting 
a large drop in inflation), especially if the forecasts are conditioned on the 
available data on short-term interest rates and credit spreads. It motivates rapid 
growing theoretical and empirical literatures on DSGE model with financial 
frictions.   
In this chapter, it sets by surveying theoretical and empirical literatures focusing 
on financial frictions in the framework of DSGE macroeconomics models. The 
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theoretical studies explicitly modelling financial frictions based on extension of 
existing models. These studies differentiate the role of financial frictions originate 
from different sectors (Bananke et al.,1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Iacoviello, 
2005; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011) or the consequences 
of macroprudential policies (Angeloni and Faia, 2009; Curdia and Woodford, 
2010; Le et al., 2014). The empirical papers use different data and evaluate and 
estimation methodologies to explore the role of financial frictions and to assess 
performance and implication of models. Some concluded the inclusion of 
financial frictions played dominates role of business cycle fluctuations (De 
Graeve, 2008), while conversely, other studies reach opposite conclusion (Meier 
and Muller,2006; Le et al., 2012, 2013)). It should be noted Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2010), Quadrini (2011), Beck et al. (2014), Brazdik (2010), Brunnermeier et al., 
(2012) have provided extensive surveys about macroeconomic implications of 
financial frictions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical 
developments of DSGE models with financial frictions and their roles in the 
transmission shocks to real economy. Section 3 describes empirical assessment 
regarding to theoretical literatures. Section 3 describes recent DSGE model based 
on the UK data. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Modelling frictions in financial market    
Despite the large body of empirical literatures emphasized the importance of 
financing frictions and inherent instability of the financial system, the traditional 
macro models including the SW03, SW07 and CEE05 heavily rely on the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework in which there is no role for financial 
sector. The great recession is then a reminder that financial frictions are one of the 
drivers of business cycle fluctuations. According to existing theoretical literature, 
two channels have been distinguished to account for the transmission of shocks 
originating in the financial sector to the real economy.  A balance sheet channel 
depends on the financial friction imposed as credit constraints on non-financial 
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borrowers (demand side), while a banking lending channel depends on the credit 
constraint imposed on the side of financial intermediary (supply side). The two 
channels are always referred to the financial accelerator1.  
      2.2.1 External Finance Premium  
Brazdik et al. (2011) provides a convincing description about the differences 
between the two approaches: external financial premium and the collateral 
constraints way of modelling financial frictions. The external finance premium of 
financial frictions grounds the key micro-foundation based the assumption of 
costly state verification framework of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig 
(1985) where the friction is due to information asymmetry about the future payoff 
of the project. Each entrepreneur purchases unfinished capital from the capital 
producers at the given price and transforms it into finished capital with a 
technology that is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shock which is not 
observable to outsiders and verifying it comes at a cost. The optimal contract 
between an entrepreneur and the households providing outside funding ensures 
that the entrepreneur doesn’t take advantage of the information asymmetry and 
minimizes the deadweight loss due to costly verification. Because monitoring a 
contract is costly, it drives an external finance premium between the cost of an 
entrepreneur to raise capital on financial market (lending rate) and the opportunity 
cost of an entrepreneur’s use of internal resources2, i.e. capital raised from profits.  
The first version model originates from the seminal paper of Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) that uses an overlapping generation model where agents live for only two 
periods and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) later embed the contract problem into 
the infinite horizon real business cycle framework. Following Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) to analyze the dynamics of the model, it reveals that temporary 
shocks have a much stronger persistence through feedback effects of tightened 
financial frictions: supposing a negative productivity shock decreases the wage 
                                                          
1 The term was originally introduced by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) to challenge the Modigliani-
Miller view of the irrelevance of financing for a firm’s or for a bank’s investment decision.  
 
2 Lending rate is almost always positive and higher than risk free rate based on the data shown in De Graeve 
(2008), Abhijit(2002).  
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and current entrepreneurs’ net worth. This increases borrowing frictions to acquire 
household’s saving for the implementation of investment projects and leads to 
decreased investment in capital for the next period. The lower capital therefore 
reduces output and therefore the wage in the next period, which implies a lower 
net worth for the next generation of entrepreneurs. The next generation also 
invests less and the effect persists further. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) named 
this type of amplification a shock accelerator effect on investment income, and 
therefore further studies recognize this mechanism as the financial accelerator.  
 
      2.2.2 The Bernanke et al. (1999) model  
 
Bernanke et al. (1999) (Henceforth BGG) extend the model of Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) to present a complete dynamic New Keynesian framework with 
price stickiness that allows the possibility of credit relations between the 
households and the entrepreneurs. The model economy of BGG is populated by 
households, entrepreneurs, and retailers. In this context, the model mainly 
assumes households supply labour, consumption goods, and savings. Then 
households as net savers transfer resources to entrepreneurs through the financial 
intermediates. The entrepreneurs use the acquired funds to purchase physical 
capital used in the production of the intermediate goods. The intermediate goods 
are bought by the retailers and sold to the households. In addition, the government 
conducts both fiscal and monetary policy. The key assumption is to justify the 
existence of an external premium embedding an agency cost problem 
incorporating into a New Keynesian model. Following this approach, since 
financial intermediates are not able to control the debtor ex-ante, there exists an 
optimal contract between an entrepreneur and the financial intermediates ensuring 
that the entrepreneur doesn't take advantage of the information asymmetry and 
minimizes the deadweight loss due to costly verification. Since the financial 
frictions in the model presented in Chapter 3 is to follow BGG’s setting up. The 
description will be discussed in Chapter 3 in detail. It should be noted that the role 
of financial intermediates is trivial in the original BGG model. The intermediates 
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are only a device to justify the existence of external risk premium.  
Similar to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), as in 
BGG, the net worth of entrepreneur is pro-cyclical and it then leads to a counter-
cyclical external finance premium occurs. To show how a small shock can 
significantly affect the whole economy for a long time through financial 
accelerator mechanism, suppose in the event of a positive external finance 
premium shock, it will reduce demand for obtaining external funding due to an 
increasing cost of borrowing. Further deterioration of entrepreneur’s financial 
position leads to a further increase external finance premium and further reduction 
in demand for funding. The counter-cyclical external finance premium also 
imposes limits on the provision of funding for investment projects. It then 
consequently leads to a reduction of investment and future profits from investment. 
Because a decreasing in profits from investment, it also weakens the net worth of 
entrepreneurs and then strengthen the external premium.  
BGG then use their framework to study the dynamic propagation of a monetary 
policy shock and they compare it to the standard new Keynesian framework 
without financial intermediaries. They find that an increase of the interest rate 
causes a reduction of the capital demand that consequently decreases the price of 
capital. The capital reduction weakens the net worth of the entrepreneurs 
enhancing the external premium. The investment goes down causing a decline of 
the total output. 
The authors also contrast the immediate response to the monetary policy shock in 
the model with the delayed response in the data, it then shows the financial 
accelerator mechanism itself does not deliver the desired properties of the 
responses. They again that adding a delay in the investment process to correct this 
deficiency. The result leads to the presence of a financial accelerator may explain 
the extent and persistence of fluctuations, which are a response to monetary policy 
and demand and supply shocks. They also suggest possible extensions of their 
benchmark model such as nominal debt contracts, open economy model setup or 
involving roles for financial intermediates. In the following section, some of these 
extensions are discussed. 
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       2.2.3 Extension based on BGG 
 
During the last decade, the benchmark BGG New Keynesian model has been 
extended with two important features. The first extension is that the debt contract 
can be denominated in terms of the nominal interest rate in order to reflect the 
nature of debt contract in the US. This innovation considers the so called ‘Fisher 
effect’ that describes the effect of debt deflation effect on nominal debt contract 
as mentioned in literatures on the Great Depression by Fisher (1933).  
The second extension consists to introduce into a modified Taylor type rule under 
which the monetary authority adjusts short-term nominal interest rates. According 
to BGG, monetary policy is crucial in determining the quantitative importance of 
the financial accelerator. The greater the extent to which monetary policy can 
stabilize output, the smaller the role of the financial accelerator is, in amplifying 
and propagating business cycles in output or investment. In particular, since the 
financial crisis underlined the role of the financial stability of the credit market, 
central banks (at least advanced country) naturally have engaged in all sorts of 
unconventional monetary policies3 when greater monetary stimulus is required by 
cutting the policy rate to its effective lower bound. 
The debate of whether or not unconventional policies (macroprudential policy 
against monetary policy) as an attempt to get around the borrowing constraints 
that play a central role; the pros and cons of pursuing an unconventional monetary 
policy are animated by a series of influential papers such as Angelini et al., 2010; 
Angeloni and Faia, 2009; Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Le et al., 2014 and Meh 
and Moran, 2010. 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) modified a standard Taylor rule by introducing a 
contemporaneous response to the size of a credit spread. They found such spread 
                                                          
3 Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) grouped unconventional monetary policies into three classes: (1) using 
communications policies to shape public expectations about the future course of interest rates; (2) 
increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet; and (3) changing the composition of the central 
bank’s balance sheet. 
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adjustment could reduce the distortions caused by a financial disturbance. This 
modification of the standard Taylor rule can also improve the economy's response 
to certain variations in the size of debt-financed government transfers. 
Le et al. (2014) extended the work of Le et al. (2012) by augmenting an 
unconventional monetary policy and using cash as collateral 4 . The model 
suspends a standard Taylor rule when the nominal interest rate hits the zero bound 
(0.25% annually in their setting) and replaces with exogenous lower bound. Their 
results suggested a Taylor rule for making monetary base (M0) respond to credit 
conditions could substantially enhance the economy’s stability. It combined with 
price-level and nominal GDP targeting rules for interest rates to stabilise the 
economy in further. The authors further argued that with these rules for monetary 
control, aggressive and distortionary regulation of banks’ balance sheets becomes 
redundant. 
2.2.4 The model with collateral constraint   
The BGG framework suffers from several limitations. One of the major criticism 
is that the external finance premium does not contain limits on the availability of 
the amount of borrowing. The second approach is then to introduce collaterals 
constraints incorporate with the financial accelerator into a model. It grounds its 
micro-foundation from the incomplete markets framework of Hart and Moore 
(1994), which the amount of credit issuance by lenders to entrepreneurs is limited 
due to collateral constraints.  
This alternative approach originates firstly from the seminal paper of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) (KM97, henceforth). The line of this research introduced 
financial frictions by introducing endogenous collateral constraints that limit the 
credit capacity of borrowers less than or equal to the value of their assets holdings. 
Agents are heterogeneous in terms of their rate of time preference5, which divides 
                                                          
4 The authors considered the KM97’s collateral idea was too extreme.  
5 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) distinguished two kinds of agents: a patient one, called the gatherer, which is a 
net saver and impatient one, called the farmer. The farmer can act as an entrepreneur who wishes to finance 
his own investment project acquiring external resources from the patient agent. 
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them into lenders and borrowers. The constraint in their setup has the form:  
𝑅𝑡𝑏𝑡 ≤ 𝑞𝑡+1𝑘𝑡 . Where 𝑅𝑡  is the nominal interest rate, 𝑏𝑡  is the total amount 
borrowed, 𝑞𝑡+1 is the capital (land) price in next period, and 𝑘𝑡 is the capital (land) 
stock.  
The financial sector intermediates between two groups and introduces frictions by 
requiring that borrowers provide collateral for their loans. The need for collateral 
is then motivated by the absence of contract enforcement in the economy and 
collateral constraint is set exogenously. Hence, this approach introduces frictions 
that affect directly the quantity of loans. The rest of the model is a standard model 
of real business cycles. They showed even small scale and short-term shocks to 
productivity or income distribution can leads to prolonged changes in production, 
consumption, and prices of capital that spread throughout the economy. This is 
because the assets of firms are used not only for the productions, but also as 
collaterals. Suppose a decrease of the land price because of a negative 
technological shock, could decrease the net worth of the farmer. Producers that 
become constrained by the credit limit are forced to reduce their demand for 
investment. The decline in investments causes a further decrease of the net worth 
and a contraction of the credit available induced by a reduction of the collateral 
value. The amplification of the shock is caused by a twofold effect: 1) the limited 
availability of credit and; 2) the role of assets price (𝑞𝑡+1) further affects the 
collateral constraint. It should be noted that, different from the BGG model, the 
source of the financial accelerator effect and propagation of technology shocks is 
the interaction of asset prices for debt securitization and credit limits.  
2.2.5 Extension and criticism of the model with collateral 
constraint   
Iacoviello (2005) then extended the original model of KM97 by adding two 
features. First, the collateral used by entrepreneurs to obtain external funds is no 
longer the land; instead, they could be borrowing tied to the house stock owned 
by the entrepreneurs. Second, as Christiano et al. (2010) to BGG, it introduced 
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nominal debts against KM97 model. The paper augmented a New Keynesian 
general equilibrium model with endogenous collateral constraints and nominal 
debt that each households, entrepreneurs and banks would faces. The author finds 
a positive demand shock drives up consumer prices and asset prices, which relaxes 
the credit constraint (size of the loan) allowing agents to increase borrowing.  
In particular, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated a model with collateral 
constraints on US data in order to study the role of housing market shocks on the 
economy. They find evidences that the real estate industry is a relevant source of 
the US business cycle. Other recent applications relying on this framework 
include Calza et al. (2013) who analysed the impact of mortgage market 
characteristics on monetary transmission. Gerali et al. (2009) embedded a banking 
sector into a medium scale DSGE model. It could be seen as an extension of the 
model proposed by Iacoviello (2005) in the previous section. Brzoza-Brzezina and 
Makarski (2010) used models with collateral constraints and monopolistic 
competition in the banking sector to examine the impact of financial frictions on 
monetary transmission and a credit crunch scenario.  Marshall and Shea (2013) 
stated that the authors find that credit constraints act as a powerful ‘butterfly effect’ 
for the amplification and propagation of shocks. The amplification of shocks first 
reduces the price of collateral; second, restrict access to credit, which in turn 
reduce demand for the assets, further lowering its price. This financial accelerator 
effect helps to explain how relatively small shocks can result in large business 
cycle fluctuations.  
Although the collateral constraint approach of KM97 has some empirical 
advantages that the financial constraint of households can influence the constraint 
of entrepreneurs. However, in this framework, there is no endogenously 
determined financial premium, the borrower instead is rationed from the financial 
market if it reaches his maximum borrowing capacity determined by loan-to-value 
ratio. Another major criticism of KM97 and Iacoviello (2005) is that there is no 
assumption for uncertainty regarding the repayment of loans.  Cordoba and Ripoll 
(2004) modified KM’s assumption to use more realistic version that the 
amplification of fluctuations in real economic cycles can be generated by a small 
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degree of smoothing and high utilization of assets to secure debt in the production 
function. However, they demonstrate the insignificance of the financial 
accelerator effect for the amplification of responses. They conclude that unless 
one has this right combination of parameters, usually collateral constraints can 
only generate relatively small amplification comparing with original models. 
Large amplification can only be obtained with the combination of a low elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution, a large (but not too close to unity) capital share and 
share of constrained agents. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) compared the impulse 
response functions from a model based on the BGG against a model based on 
collateral constraint. They find that the collateral constraint model failed to 
reproduce hump-shaped impulse response functions and they tend to generate 
volatilities for the price of capital and the rate of return on capital are not 
consistent with the data. 
 
2.2.6 Credit Constraint on Banking Sector 
 
In either BGG or KM model, the role of banks or financial intermediates were not 
specified, as financial contracts are arranged directly in the financial market under 
the known form of a contract for the acquisition of external funding. The literature 
introducing a bank or financial intermediate friction into DSGE models has been 
motivated mainly by the aim of explaining specific features of the financial crisis. 
The bank sector friction can be divided into two separate components: 1) the bank 
lending channel and 2) the bank capital channel. The idea of bank lending channel 
was manifested originally from Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The underlying idea 
behind the bank lending channel is that banks’ cost of funds increases in response 
to restrictive monetary policy. A tightening monetary policy on the one hand, is 
the standard effect of monetary policy that decreases money supply. On the other 
hand, it entails a change in the asset composition, leading to a stronger decline in 
credit supply.  
Extending the idea of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Goodfriend and McCallum 
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(2007) paved the way to contributions that tried to give to the banking system a 
greater role in the business cycle.  Similar to external financial premium in BGG, 
it also emphasises the influence of the net worth or equity position of the financial 
intermediate on the credit conditions these agents face. The model features two 
opposite effects: a standard financial (bank) accelerator effect as in BGG against 
a banking attenuator effect.  Banking attenuator effect refers to a sluggish and 
heterogeneous pass through of the change in the policy rate to the bank interest 
rate.  This is because perfectly competitive banks are introduced to generate a 
variety of loans using a loan production function that employs both loan 
monitoring costs and collateral. Suppose there is an expansionary monetary policy 
shock to increase the consumption, due to the cash in advance constraints, it leads 
to an increase in households’ demand for bank deposits, which in turn increases 
banks’ demand for collateral and the price of issuing loans6. The character of the 
production function also implies that the monitoring costs grow faster than the 
amount of loans. The higher costs of lending given by the increased spread 
dampen the demand for loans and discourage consumption.  Hence, the overall 
effect of a monetary policy shock can be dampened by the presence of a banking 
system in the model. 
Curdia and Woodford (2009) extended a standard NK model with a banking sector 
to consider financial intermediation. In their paper, intermediation exists among 
households and but not between households and firms. Due to different rates of 
patience, part of the households are borrowers while others are lenders. Borrowers 
have a higher marginal utility of consumption than lenders. Therefore, the 
optimality conditions of the model contain two discount factors and Consequently, 
the model produces two different interest rates. The spread between the interest 
rate available to lender and the interest rate that borrowers pay for the loan is time 
varying. The financial imperfection in their model takes the form of a wedge 
between borrowing and lending rates, which may be either due to the use of 
resources in intermediation, or due to the market power of intermediaries. An 
                                                          
6 Bond price is inversely related to yield rate.  
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increase in the wedge, at the same average interest rate, decreases the lending rate 
and increases the borrowing rate. Gertler and Karadi (2011) then proposed a 
model with unconventional monetary policy. They embed financial intermediaries 
subject to endogenously determined financial constraints stemming from the 
agency problem. Specifically, after collecting household deposits, the bank can 
divert a fraction of the resources obtained from the market for their own purposes. 
This implies that the ability of a bank to attract deposits and to extend loans to 
firms is positively related to its current net worth and to its expected future 
earnings.  
The bank capital models have been built upon Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) 
financial accelerator model. It assumes all bank lending is financed by capital, 
which provides the incentive for banks to monitor borrowers, and thereby 
overcome the moral-hazard problems present in borrowers’ investment decisions. 
Gerali et al. (2010) augmented a DSGE model with a monopolistically 
competitive banking sector. Banks are assumed to have the market power to set 
interest rates such that a spread between deposit and lending rates arises. Banks 
supply loans to the private sector using either deposit or bank capital and are 
subject to an exogenous leverage ratio. This implies that bank capital has a 
fundamental role in determining credit supply conditions. Since bank capital is 
accumulated through retained earnings, a shock negatively hitting the profitability 
of banks will impair their ability of raising new capital. As a result of their 
deteriorated financial position banks may reduce the amount of loans they are 
willing to supply, thus deepening the initial contraction. Several other studies have 
focused on bank capital requirement imposed by banking regulations (Dib, 2009; 
Van den Heuvel, 2002, 2008). Other more recent literatures are unanimous in 
concluding that banking sector shocks and investors’ sentiment explain the largest 
share of the contraction in the economic activity. (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009); 
Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010); Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011)). 
Both the banking capital channel and the banking lending channel stress the 
importance of credit flow. Since financial intermediates are also responsible for 
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money supply by accepting deposits, they are key players in understanding the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  
 
2.3 Empirical evaluation of models with financial frictions 
 
Despite the ample theoretical work based on the financial accelerator, more works 
are keen to evaluate the empirical relevance of the class of financial friction 
models. Among those, Christiano et al., (2003) presented a model with financial 
frictions by adding a banking sector. They proposed to evaluate the Friedmand-
Schwartz hypothesis7 and analysed the role of financial frictions during the Great 
Depression. They estimated a DSGE model with a financial accelerator but only 
calibrated the parameters related to the financial frictions. The model identifies an 
increase in preferences for holding money and a shift away from savings over the 
period. De Greave (2008) and Christensen and Dib (2008) emphasized the 
prominence role of financial accelerator mechanism. Christensen and Dib (2008) 
estimated the standard BGG model for the U.S. using maximum likelihood and 
find evidence in favour of the financial accelerator model. De Graeve (2008) 
estimated the external finance premium for the U.S. economy incorporating a 
financial accelerator into the SW03 model. Both results found that model 
incorporating financial frictions improves the empirical performance of an 
otherwise standard DSGE model. They find that increases in the external finance 
premium lead to significant and protracted declines in investment and output. 
Christiano et al. (2010) extended SW07 model augmented with a detailed 
description of the financial sector. The model presented and estimated to analysed 
the business cycle implications of financial frictions during the financial crisis on 
Euro Area and U.S. data.  Christiano et al. (2010) featureed both agency problems 
in entrepreneurs and financial intermediates. They further allowed producers to 
                                                          
7 They suggested a more accommodative monetary policy could have greatly reduced the severity of the 
Great Depression 
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raise capital through nominal contracts. Besides the mechanism of propagation as 
in BGG, the study also emphasizes the role of financial intermediate sector as a 
source of shocks. The model proposed a competitive banking system in which the 
banks can decide the amount of deposits gather from the households and the 
amount entrepreneurial loans to issue that allow them to analyse the so-called 
‘bank lending channel’ together the standard financial accelerator mechanism. 
The authors hope that the introduction of the banking sector provide a better fit of 
the data by the model. The financial shocks in the model are shown to play an 
important role of explaining business cycle fluctuations. They found that factors 
that pertain to monetary and financial sector, the frictions that motivate and shape 
finance and the shocks that hit the banking function are prime determinants of 
business cycle fluctuations. Besides that, the amplifying effect of the financial 
accelerator is similar as in BGG. Moreover, they found evidences that it is 
desirable for the monetary policy to target not only inflation and output gap, but 
also the variables related to the stock market to stabilize economic activity. Villa 
(2013) started with the SW07 model and compared it to two alternative 
frameworks. The first one is a SW model augmented with BGG; the second one 
is a SW07 model augmented with financial frictions originating in financial 
intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). All models are estimated with 
Euro Area quarterly data over the period 1980-2008. The analysis shows that the 
last version model outperforms the other models in terms of the predictive power 
of inflation pressure. In Brunnermeier and Sannikov’s (2011) finding, the net 
worth of the financial intermediary sector plays a key role. It stressed the fact that 
the distribution of wealth is an important determinant of economic activity in a 
setting where financial frictions limit the flow of funds. It makes a difference 
whether net worth is in the hands of more productive agents or less productive 
agents or financial intermediaries who facilitate credit ow from less productive to 
more productive agents. The key frictions are financial contracting frictions rather 
than price or wage rigidities that are the main drivers in New-Keynesian models. 
Despite the widespread perception that financial condition can contribute to 
economic downturns, the conclusion arising from estimated medium scale DSGE 
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models with financial frictions cast some doubts on the relevance of financial 
frictions.  
Meier and Müller (2006) compared one model with a financial accelerator and the 
other model with increasing capital adjustment costs. They focused on the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism by matching the impulse response 
functions after a monetary policy shock. They argued that both models are able to 
replicate the characteristics of the observed data on investment. The authors 
consequently considered the external financing mechanism is not more important 
than the mechanism of costly investment for description of the properties of the 
transmission mechanism, and financial frictions do not play a very important role 
in the model.  
Christiano et al. (2008) developed a large and richly-specified DSGE model that 
includes financial frictions. This model is then used to analyse the slowdown in 
economic activity that occurred in 2001. The model is estimated on both US and 
euro area data and time series for the model shocks are retrieved from the 
estimation procedure. These shocks suggest that the slowdowns in both the US 
and euro area were mainly driven by a combination of demand shocks and shocks 
to the business sector, whereas banking shocks affecting either the supply or 
demand of credit played only a minor role. Another interesting finding from this 
research is that, since interest rates are less volatile in the euro area, the European 
Central Bank was able to achieve the same degree of output stabilisation than the 
Federal Reserve with smaller changes in policy rates. 
Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) compared three alternative DSGE models 
with Bayesian techniques. They consider as a benchmark SW07 NK model and 
compare it to a model characterized by an external finance premium and a model 
featuring a borrowing constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). All models are 
estimated using U.S. quarterly data over the period 1973-2008. Evidence from 
marginal likelihoods shows that models with an external finance premium are 
more in line with the data than models with a collateral constraint, however a 
clear-cut improvement with respect to the benchmark NK model cannot be 
observed.  
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Brazdik et al. (2012) raised another criticism that since the premium is derived 
only from the current value of the net worth of capital producers, the model cannot 
capture the direct effect of expectations of future economic development at the 
current premium level. Models with a financial accelerator mechanism have only 
a limited ability to capture the increase in bankruptcy rates seen during economic 
bad times. 
 
2.4 DSGE model for the UK 
For UK data, all in all, there has been considerably less work done in terms of 
DSGE modelling than there has been for other economies, such as US and EU.  
Interest in DSGE modelling of the UK has been heightened in recent years with 
the induction of Bank of England Quarterly Model (BEQM)8. However, since the 
BEQM has no similarity in important respects with CEE model of the United 
States and SW03 model of the EU. It was difficult to use BEQM to compare the 
structure of the U.K. economy with that of other economies (DiCecio and Nelson, 
2007).   
The BEQM was then replaced since 2011 that the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) has launched a new forecasting platform to help its quarterly economic 
forecasts, named Central Organising Model for Projection Analysis & Scenario 
Simulation (COMPASS). COMPASS is a medium to large-scale New Keynesian 
DSGE model9 built on the tradition of SW03, CEE05 and SW07 with similarities 
to those implemented in other central banks over recent years. COMPASS 
includes a suite of 50 forecasting models, covering a range of different 
frameworks and ways of thinking about the economy (Domit et al., 2016). A 
number of similar features about the real rigidities included in COMPASS, such 
habit formation and investment adjustment costs, and nominal prices and wages 
rigidities. DiCecio and Nelson (2007) estimated a DSGE model of CEE (2005) 
                                                          
8 See Harrison et al., 2005 for a more detailed description.   
9 See Burgess et al. (2013), Section 2 for a much fuller discussion. 
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on the U.K pre-crisis data Their estimates suggested price stickiness is more 
important than wage stickiness as the major source of nominal rigidity in the U.K. 
Besides that, other features including international trade in imports and exports; 
and the presence of ‘rule of thumb’ households are also incorporated. The 
COMPASS model economy is populated by households, firms, a central bank, a 
government, while the rest-of-the-world economy are treated as exogenous. 
According to Fawcett et al. (2015), COMPASS is estimated with Bayesian 
maximum likelihood methods on UK data for 15 variables using 18 shocks.  
Among those shocks, a permanent labour augmented productivity shock shifts the 
stochastic trend of the model, reflecting a statistical assumption that GDP and the 
expenditure components of GDP are integrated of order one and cointegrated with 
each other. It should be noted COMPASS was introduced at the centre of a suite 
of models to organise the production of the MPC’s forecast. The suite of models10  
contains many different models of varying types and classes with different 
purposes. It then translates existing models into the new platform.  
Fawcett et al. (2015) evaluated the accuracy of real-time forecasts for inflation 
and GDP growth from COMPASS for the UK before, during and after the 
financial crisis.  They found the accuracy of all forecasts fell during the financial 
crisis, and the deterioration was particularly marked for the GDP growth forecasts. 
They argued current DSGE models is not well suited to capturing the implications 
of large financial shocks that may have non-linear effects.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the review traces back the history of financial frictions within 
DSGE model, from the pioneering works of BGG and KM to the recent works of 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). The motivation behind the chapter is without doubts 
related to the recent financial crisis. In the last decade, we witness an explosion 
                                                          
10 Burguss et al (2013) compares the COMPASS with its alternative suite model. They discussed Gertler 
and Karadi (2011) DSGE model and Barnett and Thomas (2013) Structural VAR model in Section 5.  
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of macro dynamic model that try to introduce financial frictions into the Real 
Business Cycle or New Keynesian framework. Financial frictions can be included 
by introducing an external financing premium that risky entrepreneurs, because 
of the uncertainty of the projects they undertake, have to pay when they borrow 
funds from the financial intermediates. This friction originates from the problem 
of asymmetric information and costly state verification between the two types of 
agents. Financial frictions can also be included by imposing restrictions based on 
the need to collateralize the loan to cover inability to fulfil obligations under a 
financial contract.  Nevertheless, the empirical studies do not always admit 
financial frictions as dominates to DSGE models. Studies either rejected the 
hypothesis of significant financial markets friction (Meier and Müller, 2006; 
Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa, 2013) or impeded financial shocks from other non-
financial shocks as a key ingredient to model (le et al 2012, 2013). 
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Chapter 3: A small open economy DSGE model 
with external finance premium 
3.1  Introduction 
The standard New Keynesian model assumes that financial markets work 
perfectly so that the interest rate set by central banks uniquely determines the cost 
of credit for borrowers. The recent financial crisis nevertheless has exposed the 
weakness of this simplifying assumption and revived interest in business cycle 
models with financial frictions. A growing number of literatures follow the trail 
set by seminal works developed in this field in the last two decades (among others, 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997; Christensen and Dib, 2008; De Graeve, 2008; Geltain, 2010). These 
studies regard the potential role of financial factor as a source of shocks itself and 
assumes that financial frictions work as a mechanism of transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks. 
The closest empirical exercise to the framework of this study is contained in Le 
et al (2012, 2013) who borrows SW07 model but allow for more heterogeneity in 
price and wage behaviour and integrated in BGG financial accelerator mechanism. 
My contribution would be twofold. First, I would extend their framework by 
allowing the Armington (1969) substitution elasticity between domestic and 
foreign goods by adding a CES preference structure following the study of 
Meenagh et al (2005, 2010) and Minford (2015), to adjust for a small open 
economy model. Second, I would apply this modification to a variant of the Le et 
al (2013) model of EA and revisit it based on U.K. data. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows. The following Section 3.2 lays out the structure of the model 
with adding features and relative equations. Section 3.3 discusses its calibration. 
The responses of macroeconomic and financial variables to a variety of shocks 
are illustrated and resented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.  
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3.2 The model economy 
In this section, I describe a small open model economy populated by seven classes 
of agents: households, employment agencies, capital producers, 
entrepreneur/intermediate goods producers, final goods producer, a government 
and a central bank. The model features a continuum of infinite lived risk-averse 
households who consume one homogeneous consumption goods traded at the 
international level. Household consume a buddle of both home and import goods 
but with a preference bias towards the home good. The production of the home 
goods is also differentiated to domestic goods for home country and import goods 
for foreign country. Household supply labour partly to differentiated and sticky 
wage labour unions and partly in a perfectly competitive labour market without a 
union. There is also a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs who use their own 
net worth and a debt contract with perfectly competitive financial intermediaries 
to finance the capital expenditure. Entrepreneurs use capital and hired labour from 
labour union as inputs to produce intermediate goods. Productivity of each 
entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic shock which cannot be observed by 
financial intermediates. This presence creates financial frictions as in Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) leads to a premium paid by entrepreneurs over the 
risk-free interest rate paid by banks to households’ deposits. Furthermore, a 
perfectly competitive sector of capital producers combines the existing capital 
from entrepreneurs with investment flows to produce the installed capital stock 
then rented to entrepreneurs one time to next. Perfectly competitive retailers sell 
the aggregated intermediate goods as a composite final good to the households. 
Final good is made up in a fixed proportion of intermediate goods sold partly in 
an imperfectly competitive market (sticky price) and in sold competitive market 
(flexible price). The aggregate output produced is then converted into 
consumption, investment, goods used up in capital utilization, and net export. In 
addition, the government finance their expenditures by collecting lump sum taxes 
from the households and the central bank conducting monetary policy according 
to a Taylor rule. 
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I extend a two country Armington (1969) version of the open economy DSGE 
model by adding financial frictions as modelled in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999). The main difference worth highlighting is that:  
1. The core framework follows SW07 but essentially dropping an 
intertemporal Euler equation corresponding to household capital 
accumulation and adding three equations that characterize the financial 
frictions: a) the equation characterizing the contract selected by 
entrepreneur, b) the equation characterizing zero profits for the financial 
intermediaries and c) the law of motion of entrepreneurial net worth.  
2. The set of stochastic shocks follows SW03 because in SW07 there is the 
so-called risk premium shock that represents a wedge between the interest 
rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the 
households. However, in this model, the risk premium shock was not 
given a rigorous structural interpretation as it would have if it were 
specified as a feature of preferences shock as in SW03.   
3. The wage and price setting follows Le et al (2011) proposed ‘a hybrid 
model11 assuming that wage and price setters find themselves supplying 
labour and intermediate output partly in a competitive market with price 
and wage flexibility, and partly in a market with imperfect competition.’ 
3.2.1 Households 
Each household (𝑗) chooses consumption, labour supply (hours) and savings to 
maximize a non-separable12 utility function with two arguments, consumption 
                                                          
11 In order to test against the original SW model, Meenagh et al (2009) assign a ‘New Classical’ model under 
the assumption of complete price and wage flexibility. Their results suggest that the observed demand shocks 
have too little persistence to capture the variability of real variables in the NK setting up, but they generate 
too much variability in nominal variables in the NC model. On the other hand, the observed supply shocks 
matter little for the NK but are about right in size and persistence for the real variables in the NC. The 
implication is that the flexibility of prices and wages may lie somewhere between New Keynesian and the 
NC models. They then proposed a hybrid model that a weighted average of the SWNK and SWNC with the 
weights respectively with certain fraction.  
12 According to Merola (2014), the non-separable property of the utility function implies that consumption 
will also depend on expected employment growth. Therefore, when the inverse of elasticity of the 
intertemporal substitution is smaller than one (𝜎𝑐 , 𝜎𝑙 < 1), consumption and labour supply are complements. 
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and labour effort. The expected lifetime utility of a representative household is as 
follows  
 
max
𝐶𝑡+𝑠,𝐿𝑡+𝑠
[∑𝛽𝑠 (
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠(𝑗)  − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑠−1)
1−𝜎𝑐
1 − 𝜎𝑐
) exp (
𝜎𝑐 − 1
1 + 𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡+𝑠(𝑗)
1+𝜎𝑙)]
∞
𝑠=0
 (3.1) 
 
where 𝛽 is the discount factor, 𝐸𝑡  is the rational expectation operator, 𝐶𝑡(𝑗) is 
consumption, ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑠−1 is set to capture the external aggregate consumption habit, 
𝐿𝑡(𝑗) denotes the labour hours, 𝜎𝑐13 and 𝜎𝑙 denote the inverse of the elasticity of 
inter-temporal substitution and labour supply, respectively. Each household (𝑗) 
faces the inter-temporal budget constraint of the form:  
 
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡(𝑗) + 𝑃𝑡𝐼𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐵𝑡(𝑗) + 𝑆𝑡𝐵𝑡
𝑓(𝑗) 
≤ 𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1(𝑗) + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝐵𝑡−1
𝑓 (𝑗)+𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡(𝑗)              (3.2) 
Households not only spend their total income 𝑌𝑡(𝑗) on consumption but also hold 
their financial wealth in form of nominal domestic bonds 𝐵𝑡(𝑗), paying the risk-
free gross nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡) in one period and nominal foreign 
bond 𝐵𝑡
𝑓(𝑗)(denominated in foreign currency at 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
) paying the gross nominal 
foreign interest rate 𝑅𝑡
𝑓 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓) in one period. 𝑆𝑡 is the nominal interest rate. 
On the other hand, the households’ total income 𝑌𝑡(𝑗) reads  
 
𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡(𝑗) = 𝑊𝑡
ℎ(𝑗)𝐿𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡                       (3.3) 
                                                          
13 In general, according to SW07, only when 𝜎𝑐 > 1 (or elasticity of intertemporal substitution < 1 ), it 
implies that consumption and labour hours worked are complements in utility and consumption depends 
positively on current hours worked and negatively on expected growth in hours worked 
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The household supplies perfectly elastic labour services 𝐿𝑡(𝑗), taking the form of 
nominal wage 𝑊𝑡
ℎ(𝑗)  as given. Also, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡  stands for the dividends from the 
entrepreneurs, and 𝑇𝑡 denotes lump sum tax transfer. Following Minford (2014), 
the foreign bond price is assumed to be cost at foreign consumption baskets  𝐶𝑡
∗ 
at price  𝑃𝑡
∗, the foreign CPI, or in terms of the domestic currency, 𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗. 𝜀𝑡
𝑏 is a 
risk premium shock which represents a wedge between the policy rate controlled 
by the central bank and the interest rate faced by households. As such the risk 
premium shock was not given a rigorous structural interpretation as it would have 
if it were specified as a feature of preferences shock as in SW03 that explained by 
Chari et al. (2009).  𝜀𝑡
𝑏 follows a AR(1) process with an IID Normal error term: 
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑏 = 𝜌𝑏ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑏.  
Formally, the optimization problem can be summarized as: 
max
{𝐶𝑡+𝑠,𝐿𝑡+𝑠,𝐵𝑡+𝑠,𝐵𝑡+𝑠
𝑓
}  
𝐸0{[∑𝛽
𝑠 (
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠(𝑗)  − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑠−1)
1−𝜎𝑐
1 − 𝜎𝑐
) exp (
𝜎𝑐 − 1
1 + 𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡+𝑠(𝑗)
1+𝜎𝑙)]
∞
𝑠=0
 
− 𝜆𝑡 [𝐶𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐼𝑡(𝑗) +
𝐵𝑡(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
+
𝑆𝑡𝐵𝑡
𝑓(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
− 𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑅𝑡−1
𝐵𝑡−1(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
− 𝑅𝑡
𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝐵𝑡−1
𝑓 (𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
−
𝑊𝑡
ℎ(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑡(𝑗) −
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡
𝑃𝑡
+
𝑇𝑡
𝑃𝑡
]}        
 
The first order condition (FOC henceforth) by dropping (𝑗) therefore yields:  
𝜕𝐶𝑡: 𝜆𝑡 = (
𝜎𝑐−1
1+𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡
1+𝜎𝑙) (𝐶𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1)
−𝜎𝑐                            (3.4)  
𝜕𝐿𝑡 : 
−𝜆𝑡𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= [
1
1−𝜎𝑐
(𝐶𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1)
1−𝜎𝑐] exp (
𝜎𝑐−1
1+𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡
1+𝜎𝑙) 𝐿𝑡
𝜎𝑙        (3.5)  
          𝜕𝐵𝑡 ∶  
𝜆𝑡
𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑃𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽𝑅𝑡
𝜆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
 )                                                      
=> 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
𝜀𝑡
𝑏) = 1                                     (3.6) 
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   𝜕𝐵𝑡
𝑓:  
𝜆𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽𝑅𝑡
𝜆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑆𝑡+1) 
=> 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑡
𝑆𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
 ) = 1                             (3.7) 
The optimality conditions with respect to consumption (2.4) and domestic bond 
(2.6) result in the consumption Euler equation: 
 
𝐸𝑡 (𝛽
(
𝜎𝑐 − 1
1 + 𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡+1
1+𝜎𝑙) (𝐶𝑡+1 − ℎ𝐶𝑡)
−𝜎𝑐
(
𝜎𝑐 − 1
1 + 𝜎𝑙
𝐿𝑡
1+𝜎𝑙) (𝐶𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1)−𝜎𝑐
𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
𝜀𝑡
𝑏) = 1          (3.8) 
 
The budget constraint is also equivalent14 to: 
𝐶𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐼𝑡(𝑗) + 𝑏𝑡(𝑗) +
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗𝑏𝑡
𝑓(𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
≤ 𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑅𝑡−1𝑏𝑡−1(𝑗) + 𝑅𝑡
𝑓  𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓 (𝑗)
𝑃𝑡
+𝑌𝑡(𝑗)   
(3.9) 
where 𝑏𝑡(𝑗), 𝑏𝑡
𝑓(𝑗) are real domestic bond and real foreign bond, respectively. It 
also assumes exports goods from domestic country have little impact on the rest 
of the world so that  𝑃𝑡
∗ ≅ 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
, where 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
 represents the foreign consumption 
goods price.  
By replacing 𝑃𝑡
∗ with 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
, the FOC (dropping 𝑗) also yields: 
𝜕𝑏𝑡 ∶  𝜆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(𝛽𝑅𝑡𝜆𝑡+1)                                                        
=> 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
𝑅𝑡) = 1                                     (3.10) 
   𝜕𝑏𝑡
𝑓:  
𝜆𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽𝑅𝑡
𝜆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑆𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 ) 
                                                          
14 The reason to express the domestic and foreign bond in real term is to derive the real exchange rate 𝑄𝑡 in 
the real uncovered interest parity equation.  
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=> 𝐸𝑡 (𝛽
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑡
𝑆𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
 
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓
𝑃𝑡
𝑓 ) = 1                             (3.11) 
 
The optimality portfolio allocation between foreign and domestic bonds 
conditions for equation (3.10) and (3.11) implies optimal choice between real 
foreign and domestic bond can also yield the uncovered real interest parity 
condition (URIP):  
(1 + 𝑟𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
 
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓
𝑃𝑡
𝑓 (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓)                        (3.12) 
=> (1 + 𝑟𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡
𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓)                   (3.13) 
where  𝑄𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑓
𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡  is equivalent to the real exchange rate that the foreign 
consumption goods price in domestic currency relative to the domestic general 
price level. In other words, the unit cost of the real foreign bond is 𝑄𝑡 . This 
specifies that the returns on domestic and foreign bonds are equalised when 
measured in same currency. With the nominal exchange rate 𝑆𝑡 can be fixed at 
unity, 𝑄𝑡 can also be treated as the import price relative to the domestic general 
price.  
In the context of this small open economy model, one assumes complete financial 
markets at both domestic and foreign levels. We only consider effective returns 
on domestic bonds are affected by a time varying risk premium shock on bond 
holdings represented by the 𝜀𝑡
𝑏. As it should be clear, the log linearized the URIP 
condition, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
is an exact equation. There is an implicit 
exogenous risk-premium shock in foreign bond holdings which is supposed to be 
constant. Similar assumptions can also be found in Minford (2016) and Meenagh 
et al (2013).  
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3.2.2 Foreign sector 
According to Armington (1969), consumption bundle 𝐶𝑡 are differentiated not 
only by inherent differences in their characteristics, but also by their place of 
production. However, for simplicity we assumed that goods do not enter in the 
production process but are only exchanged as final goods. The aggregate 
consumption as a bundle of domestic and foreign goods can be represented as a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) index given by:  
 
𝐶𝑡 = [𝜔
𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)−𝜌 + (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)−𝜌]
−1
𝜌                                  (3.14a) 
 
Preferences for the foreign countries (denoted with the asterisk) are defined in a 
similar fashion: 
 
𝐶𝑡
∗ = [𝜔𝑓(𝐶𝑡
𝑑∗)
−𝜌∗
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑓)𝜍𝑡
∗(𝐶𝑡
𝑓∗)
−𝜌∗
]
−1
𝜌∗
                          (3.15) 
 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝑑  denotes the consumption of home goods, 𝐶𝑡
𝑓
 denotes the consumption 
of imported goods, 𝜔𝑑  denotes the weight of home goods in the consumption 
function, 𝜔𝑓 denotes the foreign equivalents to home bias. The marginal 
substitution elasticity between home and foreign varieties of good is constant 
at 𝜎 =
1
1+𝜌
> 0, 𝜎𝑓 =
1
1+𝜌∗
> 0 respectively.  𝜍𝑡 , 𝜍𝑡
∗  are preference errors.  
The household choose 𝐶𝑡
𝑑 and 𝐶𝑡
𝑓
 to maximise equation (3.14) subject to: 
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑑𝐶𝑡
𝑑 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝐶𝑡
𝑓
                                (3.16) 
where 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 is the price of domestically produced goods, 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
 is the foreign price of 
imported goods in domestic currency and 𝑃𝑡 is the aggregate CPI. The equation 
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can be alternatively expressed by numeraire  𝑃𝑡 to one unity: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
𝑑𝐶𝑡
𝑑 + 𝑄𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑓
                                  (3.17) 
where 𝑝𝑡
𝑑 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑃𝑡
 is the domestic price relative to the general CPI price level. As 
discussed above, 𝑄𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑓
𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑡  is the real exchange rate that the foreign price in 
domestic currency relative to the domestic general CPI price level, with the 
nominal exchange rate 𝑆𝑡 can be fixed at unity.  
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem then is: 
𝐿 = [𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)−𝜌 + (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)−𝜌]
−1
𝜌 + 𝜆(𝐶𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑑𝐶𝑡
𝑑 + 𝑄𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑓)    (3.14a) 
and the first order condition yields: 
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑑 :  {[𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−𝜌
]}
−
1+𝜌
𝜌
𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−(1+𝜌)
− 𝜆𝑝𝑡
𝑑 = 0  
=> {[𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)−𝜌 + (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)−𝜌]
−1
𝜌 }
1+𝜌
𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−(1+𝜌)
= 𝜆𝑝𝑡
𝑑   (3.18a) 
 
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑓 : {[𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−𝜌
]}
−
1+𝜌
𝜌 (1 − 𝜔𝑑)(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−(1+𝜌)
− 𝜆𝑄𝑡
= 0  
=> {[𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−𝜌
]
−1
𝜌
}
1+𝜌
(1 − 𝜔𝑑)(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−(1+𝜌)
= 𝜆𝑄𝑡           
(3.19a) 
𝜕𝐶𝑡:  𝜆 = 1 
By replacing [𝜔𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡(𝐶𝑡
𝑓)
−𝜌
]
−1
𝜌
with 𝐶𝑡 Demands for 
domestically produced and imported consumption goods are rearranged to be 
given by: 
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𝐶𝑡
𝑑 = (𝜔𝑑)𝜎(𝑝𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜎
𝐶𝑡                                                   (3.18b) 
𝐶𝑡
𝑓 = ((1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡)
𝜎(𝑄𝑡)
−𝜎𝐶𝑡                                         (3.19b) 
The symmetric foreign demand for domestically produced goods relative to 
foreign consumption can also be specified: 
(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
∗
= (𝜔𝑓)𝜎
𝑓
(𝑝𝑡
𝑑)
−𝜎𝑓
𝐶𝑡
∗                                            (3.20) 
𝐶𝑡
𝑓∗ = ((1 − 𝜔𝑓)𝜍𝑡
∗)
𝜎𝑓
(𝑄𝑡
∗)−𝜎𝑓𝐶𝑡
∗                                  (3.21) 
The expression of the real exchange rate, 𝑄𝑡, can be obtained by plugging (3.18b) 
to (3.19b) back into (3.17): 
𝜔𝑑(𝑝𝑡
𝑑)
𝜌𝜎
+ ((1 − 𝜔𝑑)𝜍𝑡)
𝜎
(𝑄𝑡)
𝜌𝜎 = 1                               (3.22) 
A simple transformation involves the linearization of (3.22) by means of a first-
order Taylor series expansion around 𝑝𝑑 = 𝜎 = 𝜍 = 1 now reads: 
ln𝑝𝑡
𝑑 = −(
1−𝜔𝑑
𝜔𝑑
)
𝜎
ln(𝑄𝑡) −
1
𝜌
(
1−𝜔𝑑
𝜔𝑑
)
𝜎
ln(𝜍𝑡) + constant                         (3.23) 
The import demand function from (3.19) reads: 
𝑖𝑚𝑡 = ln𝐶𝑡
𝑓 = 𝜎 ln(1 − 𝑤) + ln𝐶𝑡 − 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑚,𝑡                      (3.24) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜎ln𝜍𝑡. Since 𝑄𝑡
∗ =
𝑝𝑡
𝑓∗
𝑝𝑡
∗ =
𝑝𝑡
𝑑
𝑝𝑡
∗  , then ln𝑄𝑡
∗ = ln𝑃𝑡
𝑑 − ln𝑄𝑡.  
The export demand function from (3.20) reads: 
𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ln𝐶𝑡
𝑑· = 𝜎𝐹 ln(1 − 𝑤𝐹) + ln𝐶𝑡
· + 𝜎𝐹
1
𝑤
ln𝑄𝑡 + constant + 𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑥  (3.25)             
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑥 = 𝜎𝐹ln𝜍𝑡
∗ +
1
𝜌
𝜎𝐹
1−𝑤
𝑤
ln𝜍𝑡.  
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3.2.3 Capital producers 
This subsection presents the setup of capital producers which determine the price 
of capital, which simplifies the optimisation problem of households compared to 
SW07. Capital producers operate in the competitive market and take prices as 
given. They choose the capital utilization rate that transforms physical capital into 
effective capital according to: 𝐾𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑧𝑡𝐾𝑡−1. At the end of each period, they buy 
existing capital 𝐾𝑡−1 from entrepreneurs and combine it with investment goods 
𝐼𝑡 to construct new capital 𝐾𝑡, which is then sold to entrepreneurs. Following the 
set up in CEE (2005), capital goods producers are subject to quadratic investment 
adjustment costs specified as function  𝑆(
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
) , and in steady state 𝑆 = 𝑆′ =
0, 𝑆′′(. ) > 0.  With 𝐼𝑡  purchased, they will produce [1 − 𝑆(
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
)]𝐼𝑡  unit of 
investment goods. Adding the depreciated physical capital stock from the 
entrepreneurs, the new capital is given by: 
𝐾𝑡(𝑖) = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 [1 − 𝑆 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
)] 𝐼𝑡(𝑖)               (3.26) 
where 𝐼𝑡(𝑖) is investment, 𝐾𝑡(𝑖) is capital holding, and 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) is the rate of 
capital deprecation The function 𝑆(. ) denotes the adjustment cost in investment 
and 𝛿  denotes the depreciation rate. The capital production technology is also 
affected by an investment-specific shock 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  follows the stochastic process:  
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑖 . 
The optimal problem of capital producer is to choose the level of investment and 
capital to maximize profits from the formation of new capital by dropping (𝑖): 
max
𝐼𝑡+𝑠,𝐾𝑡+𝑠
𝐸𝑡 [∑𝛽
𝑠𝜆𝑡+𝑠𝑀𝑡+𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
]                                                      
𝑀𝑡+𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡+𝑠
𝑘 [(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝑠−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖𝐼𝑡+𝑠 (1 − 𝑆 (
𝐼𝑡+𝑠
𝐼𝑡+𝑠−1
))]  
−𝑃𝑡+𝑠
𝑘 (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝑠−1 − 𝐼𝑡+𝑠 
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Subject to equation (3.26) 
The profits 𝑀𝑡 are presented by the differences between the revenue from selling 
the capital 𝐾𝑡 at real price of capital 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘  and the costs of buying capital from 
entrepreneurs and investment 𝐼𝑡. Since the marginal rate of transformation from 
previously installed capital after depreciation to new capital is unity, the real price 
of new and used capital are the same.  
The FOC to this optimization problem yields the following investment demand 
function: 
1 = 𝜀𝑡
𝑖𝑃𝑡
𝑘(1 − 𝑆 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
) − 𝑆′ (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
)
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
) − 𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑖 𝑆′ (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
) (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
)
2
]  
(3.27) 
It relates the price of capital to investment adjustment cost and marginal 
adjustment cost. The presence of these two variables mitigates the response of 
investment to different shocks, which affects the price of capital.  
 
3.2.4 Entrepreneurs (Intermediate goods producers) 
The presence of financial friction alters the setup of intermediate goods producers 
compared to the SW07 model. The subsector describes the set-ups follows BGG 
by assuming that entrepreneurs act as the intermediate goods producer hire labour 
and purchase installed capital in a constant return to scale technology to produce 
the intermediate goods, and meanwhile use net worth and borrow funds from 
financial intermediaries to acquire the capital used in the production process. 
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and face a constant probability of surviving to the 
next period. This ensures that the entrepreneurs’ net worth would never exceed 
the value of new capital acquisition.  
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An entrepreneur (𝑖) produces the intermediate good 𝑖 according to the following 
production function: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑖) = 𝜀𝑡
𝑎𝐾𝑡
𝑠(𝑖)𝛼 (𝛾𝑡𝐿𝑡(𝑖))
1−𝛼 − 𝛾𝑡𝛷                (3.28) 
where 𝐾𝑡
𝑠(𝑖) is captial services used in production, 𝐿𝑡(𝑖) is aggregate labour input. 
The parameter 𝛼 captures the share of capital in production, 𝛷 denotes the fixed 
cost and 𝛾𝑡  represents the labour augmenting deterministic growth rate in the 
economy. 𝜀𝑡
𝑎 is total factor productivity shock follows the ARIMA(1,1,0) process: 
𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡
𝑎
𝑡−1
+ 𝜌𝑎(𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡
𝑎
𝑡−1
− 𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡
𝑎
𝑡−2
) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑎                   (3.29) 
The entrepreneur firm(𝑖)’s profit is given by 
 ∑ 𝛽𝑠(𝑃𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑖) − 𝑊𝑡+𝑠𝐿𝑡+𝑆(𝑖) − 𝑅𝑡+𝑠
𝑘 𝐾𝑡+𝑠(𝑖))      
∞
𝑠=0 (3.30)  
it chooses optimal capital stock with 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 , the nominal rental rate on effective 
capital and labour with  𝑊𝑡, the aggregate nominal wage to minimise its cost.  The 
solution to the cost-minimization problem determines subject to production 
function (3.28). The first order condition yields (dropping (𝑖)): 
𝜕𝐿𝑡(𝑖):    𝑊𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡𝛾
(1−𝛼)𝑡(1 − 𝛼)𝜀𝑡
𝑎 (
𝐿𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝑠)
−𝛼
                                    (3.31)  
𝜕𝐾𝑡(𝑖):    𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡𝛾
(1−𝛼)𝑡(𝛼𝜀𝑡
𝑎) (
𝐿𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝑠)
1−𝛼
                                          (3.32)  
where 𝑀𝐶𝑡 is the marginal cost.  
The above two equations can determine a capital to labour ratio across all 
producers: 
𝐾𝑡
𝑠 =
𝑊𝑡
 𝑅𝑡
𝑘
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
𝐿𝑡                                                  (3.34) 
and the marginal cost for producing one extra unit is assumed to be the same for 
all firms and can also be derived as: 
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𝑀𝐶𝑡 =
(𝑅𝑡
𝑘)
𝛼
(𝑊𝑡)
1−𝛼
𝜀𝑡
𝑎𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼
                                           (3.35) 
Equation (3.34) to (3.35) is identical to that in the SW07 economy.  
Each entrepreneur also chooses the optimal capital utilization rate to solve the 
following maximizing problem:  
max
𝑧𝑡(𝑖)
𝑅𝑡
𝑘𝑧𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝜓(𝑧𝑡)𝐾𝑡−1                                        (3.36) 
Where  𝑧𝑡 is the real capital utilization rate, 𝜓(𝑧𝑡(𝑖)) denotes the cost of capital 
utilization per unit of physical capital15. The optimisation problem is presented by 
the following equilibrium condition:  
𝜕𝑧𝑡: 𝑅𝑡
𝑘 = 𝜓′(𝑧𝑡)                                             (3.37)  
 
3.2.5 The External Finance Premium  
Entrepreneurs then operating as the intermediate ﬁrms that buy the capital stock 
every period from the capital goods producers at price 𝑃𝑡
𝑘 determined by Tobin’s 
q, using both internal funds (that is, their own net worth) and external loans from 
the ﬁnancial intermediaries. At the end of period 𝑡, entrepreneur purchases new 
end-of-period stock of capital 𝐾𝑡+1  (to use at time 𝑡 + 1) from capital goods 
producers at the price 𝑃𝑡
𝑘. At time 𝑡 + 1, entrepreneur then receive the income 
from the marginal production of capital and gain from selling (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+1  of 
capital to capital producer at price 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘 . On the other hand, at the end of period 𝑡, 
each entrepreneur has a level of real net worth. The entrepreneurs combine their 
net worth, 𝑁𝑊𝑡+1 with a debt contract to purchase new, installed physical capital, 
𝐾𝑡+1, from the capital producer at 𝑃𝑡
𝑘. The amount of debt is 𝑃𝑡
𝑘𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑊𝑡+1.  
                                                          
15 In steady state, 𝑧 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜓 (1) = 0.  
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In equilibrium, the optimal capital demand for entrepreneur is determined by the 
average expected marginal external financing cost at 𝑡 + 1, by the given equation:  
𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1] = 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑅𝑡
𝑘 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘
𝑃𝑡
𝑘 ]                        (3.38) 
where the average expected marginal external financing cost or the return on 
capital 𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1] should be equal to 𝑅𝑡
𝑘, the marginal productivity pf capital or 
the rental rate of capital that determined by the capital producer;  plus (1 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘 , 
the return to resell the undepreciated capital stock back to capital producers 
against the cost of acquiring the stock of capital 𝑃𝑡
𝑘  at 𝑡 − 1. Equation (3.38) 
provides the linkage between the entrepreneur’s financial position and the cost of 
external funds, which in turn affects the demand for capital.  
The marginal external financing cost 𝐶𝑌𝑡  to entrepreneurs depends on their 
financial conditions. According to BGG, basing on the costly state verification of 
Townsend (1979), due to asymmetry of information between entrepreneurs and 
financial intermediaries16, the agency problem makes the entrepreneurs external 
borrowing costs are more expensive than internal funds, and solve a financial 
contract that maximises the payoff to the firm subject to the lender earning the 
required rate of return. Following Townsend (1979), when the entrepreneurs 
costlessly observe their project’s ex-post return, external lenders incur an auditing 
cost to observe the realisation of project’s ex-post return. After observing its 
outcome, an entrepreneur decides whether to repay his debt or to default. If the 
entrepreneur pays in full, there is no need to verify the return, however if the 
entrepreneur defaults, external lenders then audit the loan and recover the outcome 
minus the monitoring costs. Accordingly, the gross return rate of capital is equal 
to a gross premium for external funds over the gross real opportunity costs, which 
                                                          
16 The costly state verification of Townsend (1979) arises from the standard information asymmetry problem 
where the borrower or entrepreneur has private information about their performance in contrast with the 
lender or bank which does not have any information. To obtain this information, the lender should pay a 
monitoring cost, which justifies an external finance premium for the borrower. On the other hand, the 
idiosyncratic shocks are only observed by entrepreneurs but not by financial intermediaries, hence lending 
involves agency costs. It reﬂects in a debt contract between these two parties. 
44 | P a g e  
 
is equivalent to the riskless real gross interest rate, 𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
. According to zero 
profit condition for suppliers of funds, in this setting, the return rate of capital 
equates the premium for external funds over the real opportunity cost of investing 
in risk-free deposits: 
𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1] = 𝐸𝑡 [𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. )𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
]                             (3.39) 
with 𝐸𝑃(. ) < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑃′(1) = 0 
The external finance premium, 𝐸𝑃𝑡(. ) indicates the intermediary would only lend 
to entrepreneurs if they can be compensated by the entrepreneurs’ default risk. 
The intermediary then would charge a premium over the cost of internal funds 
(risk free rate)17.  
The external finance premium is then determined by the entrepreneurs’ leverage 
ratio, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑘𝐾𝑡+1
𝑁𝑊𝑡+1
,  and the elasticity with respect to the leverage ratio which depends 
on the structure of the financial contracts18. Following le et al (2012), the external 
finance premium also depends on an exogenous premium shock, 𝜀𝑡
𝑒𝑝𝑟
. that ‘can 
be thought of as a shock to the supply of credit: a change in the efficiency of the 
financial intermediary’s process, or a shock to the financial sector that alters the 
premium beyond what is dictated by the current economic and policy conditions.’ 
The external finance premium therefore is given by:  
𝐸𝑡[𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. )] = 𝜀𝑡
𝑒𝑝𝑟 (
𝑃𝑡
𝑘𝐾𝑡+1
𝑁𝑊𝑡+1
)
𝜒
                              (3.40) 
This shows the negative dependence of the premium on the amount of the net 
worth. Therefore, the higher the stake of entrepreneur in a project, the lower the 
premium would be required.   
                                                          
17 Following Rannenberg (2013), the difference is also called the quasi profit margin since it does not account 
for the expected costs of bankruptcy that are borne by the entrepreneur through the loan rate agreed in debt 
contract.  
18 The full derivation of the financial contract and the aggregation is shown in BGG, Appendix.  
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After entrepreneurs have settled their debt to the lender in period 𝑡 + 1, and the 
capital has been re-sold to capital producers, entrepreneurs’ net worth in period 
𝑡 + 1 is determined, which further affect the external finance premium through 
equation (3.40). The evolution of an entrepreneur’ net worth19 is defined as:  
𝑁𝑊𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑉𝑡                                                     (3.41) 
where 𝑉𝑡  denotes the value of entrepreneur’s equity. The probability that an 
entrepreneur will survive until the next period is denoted  𝜃 . In other words, 
entrepreneur’s expected lifetime is 1/(1 − 𝜃). When an entrepreneur died from 
the economy with a probability of 1 − 𝜃 during the current period, he will transfer 
his remaining value(1 − 𝜃)𝑉𝑡 to new entering entrepreneurs. Following CMR and 
Christen and Dib (2008), with the assumption that there always exits 
entrepreneurs died from the economy, it ensures that entrepreneurs’ net worth do 
not accumulate enough to fully finance the new capital acquisition so that the 
entrepreneur has to go to the capital market to borrow funds prior to purchasing 
capital. Additional, the size of the entrepreneurial sector is constant with sufficient 
numbers of new arrivals replacing departed entrepreneurs.  
The net worth of the entrepreneurs who survive is equal to the ex-post gross return 
on capital investment, 𝐶𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡−1
𝑘 𝐾𝑡 minus the cost of borrowing 𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡(𝑃𝑡−1
𝑘 𝐾𝑡 −
𝑁𝑊𝑡)] at 𝑡 − 1. Then, the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according 
to the following law of motion:  
𝑁𝑊𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑉𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑤𝜃(𝐶𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡−1
𝑘 𝐾𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1[𝐶𝑌𝑡(𝑃𝑡−1
𝑘 𝐾𝑡 − 𝑁𝑊𝑡)])   (3.42) 
where 𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑤 represents a shock to the entrepreneurial equity value and follows the 
autoregressive process: 
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑤 = 𝜌𝑛𝑤ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑛𝑤 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑛𝑤                              (3.43) 
                                                          
19 In BGG setups, work hours provided by both households and entrepreneurs, therefore the evolution of an 
entrepreneur’ net worth is defined as: 𝑁𝑊𝑡+1 = 𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑤𝜃𝑉𝑡 + 𝑊
𝑒, where 𝑊𝑒 is the wage income received by 
new entrepreneurs. Based on the empirical evidence, the estimated value of 𝑊𝑒 is relative small (BGG shows 
value equals to 0.01, Rannenberg (2013) shows the value equals to 0.008), in my model, I drop the 𝑊𝑒 from 
the equation in line with Le et al. (2013).  
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Therefore, earning at time 𝑡 with a survival rate 𝜃 then becomes the net worth at 
next period 𝑡 + 1 . As in Gertler et al. (2007), equation (3.42) suggest 
unpredictable variation of 𝑃𝑡
𝑘, play a key role since such variation provides the 
principle source of fluctuation in the equation (3.38). Suppose there is a decline 
in asset prices, this would deteriorate the borrowers’ balance sheet by decreasing 
the net worth leading to an increase in the external finance premium, and hence 
raise external financing cost. The increase in external financing cost, in turn, 
reduces the demand for capital and leads to further cuts in investment and output. 
The resulting slowdown in economic activity causes asset prices to fall further 
and deepens the economic downturn. This is the financial accelerator channel 
highlighted by BGG, and it tends to amplify the economic effects of any shock 
that has a pro-cyclical impact on economic activity. It also should be noted that 
the demand for capital of entrepreneur is determined by the return rate on capital 
from equation (3.39), the rental rate of capital from equation (3.32) and the 
dynamics of net worth from equation (3.42).  
Entrepreneurial who close business at period 𝑡 consume their remaining resources. 
The amount of the consumption is given by: 
 𝐶𝑡
𝑒 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑉𝑡                                           (3.44) 
Hence, the total amount of (1 − 𝜃)𝑉𝑡 of equity from exiting entrepreneurs should 
remove from the market.  
3.2.6 Final goods producer    
The final good producer purchases intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑖), aggregate them into 
a composite final good 𝑌𝑡 and sold to consumers in a perfectly competitive market. 
The final good is produced according to the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:  
𝑌𝑡 = (∫ 𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
1
1+𝜆𝑝,𝑡 𝑑𝑖)
1+𝜆𝑝,𝑡 
                                      (3.45) 
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Where 𝑌𝑡(𝑖) denotes the goods used in the final goods production. 𝜆𝑝,𝑡  is the 
desired mark-up of prices over marginal costs at the intermediate goods level that 
follows the exogenous stochastic AR (1) process:  
ln(𝜆𝑝,𝑡) = 𝜌𝑝 ln(𝜆𝑝,𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑝                            (3.46) 
Final goods producer maximises its profit as:  
max 𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 − ∫ 𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
𝑃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖                                           (3.47)  
subject to equation (3.45).   
The demand function of the intermediate goods then reads: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑖) = (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
− 
1+𝜆𝑝,𝑡
𝜆𝑝,𝑡
𝑌𝑡                                        (3.48) 
Integrating the above equation and imposing the final goods production function, 
it shows the price of the final good, 𝑃𝑡 is a CES aggregate of the prices of the 
intermediate goods, 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) 
𝑃𝑡 =
(
 ∫𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
1
𝜆𝑝,𝑡
𝑑𝑖
)
 
𝜆𝑝,𝑡 
                                    (3.49) 
Additionally, I follow Le et al (2011) assuming that final outputs are made up in 
a fixed fraction 𝑣𝑝 of intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑖) from a monopoly market and 
others 𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
𝑁𝐶 with a fraction of (1 − 𝑣𝑝) are from perfectly competitive market.  
The hybrid final goods output therefore takes the form: 
𝑌𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑣𝑝
(
 ∫𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
1
1+𝜆𝑝,𝑡
𝑑𝑖
)
 
1+𝜆𝑝,𝑡 
+ (1 − 𝑣𝑝)∫𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
𝑁𝐶
1
0
𝑑𝑖        (3.50) 
According to Calvo (1983), each period only a fraction of (1 − 𝜉𝑝) entrepreneurs 
are allowed to re-optimize prices 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃?̃?(𝑖). The remaining entrepreneurs with 
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a fraction of 𝜉𝑝 can only reset the price follow an adjustment mechanism with 
partial indexation. Non-re-optimized prices are partially indexed to past inflation, 
which gives rise to the backward-looking term adjusted according to the following 
indexation rule given by: 
𝑃𝑡(𝑖) = (
𝜋𝑡−1
𝜋
)
𝑙𝑝
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑖)                                                (3.51) 
where 𝜋𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 is the gross inflation rate and 𝜋 is the steady state inflation value. 
𝑙𝑝 = 1  means perfect indexation and 𝑙𝑝 = 0  means no indexation. The 
optimisation problem for setting a new nominal price ?̃?𝑡(𝑖) is to maximize the 
expected discounted stream of future firm’s profits for all states of nature. 
 max𝐸𝑡 [∑ 𝛽
𝑠 𝜆𝑡+𝑠
𝜆𝑡
𝜉𝑝
𝑠𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)(𝑃?̃?(𝑖)(Π𝑡) − 𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑠)
∞
𝑠=0 ]          (3.52) 
subject to intermediate goods demand function (3.49) 
where Π𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 = Π𝑘=1
𝑠 (
𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1
𝜋∗
)
𝑙𝑝
,  𝜆𝑡  is Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
budget constraint (equation (3.1) and (3.2)) in household optimization problem.  
The first order condition with respect to ?̃?𝑡(𝑖) is then given by 
𝐸𝑡 [∑𝛽
𝑠𝜉𝑝
𝑠𝜆𝑡+𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
?̃?𝑡𝑡+𝑠(𝑃?̃?Π𝑡,𝑡+𝑠(1 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑡+𝑠)−𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑠)] = 0        (3.53) 
where ?̃?𝑡𝑡+𝑠  is the demand in 𝑡 + 𝑠  with the chosen optimal price 𝑃?̃? . The 
aggregate price index for intermediate goods  𝑌𝑡(𝑖)  sold in an imperfectly 
competitive market is then given by: 
𝑃𝑡 = [𝜉𝑝 (𝑃𝑡−1(𝑖) (
𝜋𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
)
𝑙𝑝
)
1
𝜆𝑝,𝑡
+ (1 − 𝜉𝑝)(𝑃?̃?(𝑖))
1
𝜆𝑝,𝑡]
𝜆𝑝,𝑡
     (3.54) 
On the other hand, the aggregate price index for intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑖)
𝑁𝐶  sold 
in a perfectly competitive market is then derived when prices are flexible and the 
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price-mark-up shock is zero. It reduces to the condition that the price mark-up is 
constant: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡                                          (3.55)  
Therefore, in the hybrid model the aggregate price equation is assumed to be a 
weighted average of the corresponding NK and NC equations as follows:  
𝑃𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑤𝑟𝑃𝑡 + (1 − 𝑤
𝑟)𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐶                              (3.56) 
3.2.7 Labour unions and labour packers 
As in SW03 and SW07, the labour markets consist of labour unions, which 
allocate and differentiate homogenous labour supplied by households; and labour 
packers, who buy labour from the unions, package it into a Kimball (1995) 
composite aggregator and resell to entrepreneurs: 
𝐿𝑡 =
(
 ∫𝐿𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
1
1+𝜆𝑤,𝑡
𝑑𝑖
)
 
1+𝜆𝑤,𝑡 
                     (3.57) 
where 𝜆𝑤,𝑡 is the mark-up of real wages over the ratio of marginal disutility of 
labour to the marginal utility of consumption in a flexible economy which follows 
a AR(1) process:  
ln(𝜆𝑤,𝑡) = (1 − 𝜌𝑤) ln(𝜆𝑤) + 𝜌𝑤 ln(𝜆𝑤,𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑝     (3.58) 
The representative labour aggregate combines household’s labour in the same 
proportion as entrepreneurs would choose, which ensures that its demand for 
household labour is the same as the sum of the firm’s demand for this type of 
labour.  
The labour packer then minimises the cost by choose the optimal amount of labour 
services.  
min
𝐿𝑡,𝐿(𝑖)
∫ 𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝐿𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
                                             (3.59)  
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subject to equation (3.58) 
It then leads to the labour demand from FOC: 
𝐿𝑡(𝑖) = (
𝑊𝑡(𝑖)
𝑊𝑡
)
− 
1+𝜆𝑤,𝑡
𝜆𝑤,𝑡
𝐿𝑡                              (3.60) 
and integrating the above equation can express the aggregate wage rate, 𝑊𝑡 that 
related to the individual wage 𝑊𝑡(𝑗): 
𝑊𝑡 =
(
 ∫𝑊𝑡(𝑖)
1
0
1
𝜆𝑤,𝑡
𝑑𝑖
)
 
𝜆𝑤,𝑡 
                            (3.61) 
Unions have market power over labour services and set wages that are subject to 
Calvo scheme which is similar to the price setup. Every period only 1 − 𝜉𝑤 
fraction of intermediate labour unions can optimally re-adjust wages, and 𝜉𝑤 
fraction cannot. For those who cannot optimise their wages, the current wages are 
adjusted by Calvo pricing with partial indexation. The optimal wage rate set by 
the union maximizes the stream of future discounted wage incomes for all the 
time periods when the union is stuck with that wage in the future.   
max
?̃?𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)
𝐸𝑡 [∑𝜆𝑡+𝑠𝛽
𝑠𝜉𝑤
𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
?̃?𝑡+𝑠(𝑖) (?̃?𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)Π𝑡,𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 − 𝑊𝑡+𝑠)]            (3.62) 
with Π𝑡,𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 = Π𝑘=1
𝑠 𝛾 (
𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1
?̅?
)
𝑙𝑤
 
subject to the labour demand equation (3.60)20. The FOC yields: 
𝐸𝑡 [∑
𝜆𝑡+𝑠𝑃𝑡
𝜆𝑡𝑃𝑡+𝑠
𝛽𝑠𝜉𝑤
𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
?̃?𝑡+𝑠
1
𝜆𝑤,𝑡+𝑠
 ((1 + 𝜆𝑤,𝑡+𝑠)𝑊𝑡+𝑠 − ?̃?𝑡(𝑖)Π𝑡,𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 )] = 0 
                                                          
20 Following the indexation scheme, ?̃?𝑡+𝑠(𝑖) = [
?̃?𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)
𝑊𝑡+𝑠
(
𝜋𝑡−1
𝜋
)
𝑙𝑤
]
−𝜆𝑤,𝑡
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(3.63) 
The law of motion of the aggregate wage result in the following wage equation 
evolves: 
𝑊𝑡 = [𝜉𝑤 (𝑊𝑡−1  (
𝜋𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
)
𝑙𝑤
)
1
𝜆𝑤,𝑡
+ (1 − 𝜉𝑤)(?̃?𝑡)
1
𝜆𝑤,𝑡]
𝜆𝑤,𝑡
             (3.64) 
 
Similar to hybrid price setting, Le et al (2012) assume that firms producing 
intermediate goods have a production function that combines in a fixed fraction 
𝑤𝑤 of labour in imperfect competition as well as other (1 − 𝑤𝑤)  labour in 
competitive markets. Therefore, the labour used by intermediate firms becomes: 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑣
𝑤
(
 ∫𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝐾(𝑖)
1
0
1
1+𝜆𝑤,𝑡
𝑑𝑖
)
 
1+𝜆𝑤,𝑡 
+ (1 − 𝑣𝑤)∫𝐿𝑡
𝑁𝐶(𝑖)
1
0
𝑑𝑖       (3.65) 
so that 
𝑊𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑤𝑤𝑊𝑡 + (1 − 𝑤
𝑤)𝑊𝑡
𝑁𝐶                               (3.66) 
where 𝑊𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑
 is proposed overall hybrid wage, 𝑊𝑡 is set according to equation 
(3.64). If wages are perfectly flexible and mark up equates zero, the real wage 
𝑊𝑡
𝑁𝐶  is then equals to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
(equation 3.4) and leisure (equation 3.5).  
3.2.8 Government policy  
The fiscal authority is also set following SW07: government spending 𝐺𝑡  and 
transfers to the households are fully financed by lump sum taxes, so that the 
government’s budget is balanced each period. 𝐺𝑡  is assumed to have no direct 
effect on the utility of households. The government budget constraint is given by: 
𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1                             (3.67) 
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The monetary sector in this model also follows the original SW07 setup. It is 
operated under a monetary policy rule that specifies how the central bank reacts 
to deviations of inflation and output from steady state when it decides about policy 
interest rate.  
𝑅𝑡
?̅?
= 𝜀𝑡
𝑟 (
𝑅𝑡−1
?̅?
)
𝜌
[(
𝜋𝑡
?̅?
)
𝑟𝑝
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗)
𝑟𝑦
]
1−𝜌
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡
∗
𝑌𝑡−1
∗
)
𝑟𝛥𝑦
         (3.68) 
where 𝜌 denotes the degree of interest rate smooting, 𝑟𝑝, 𝑟𝑦 and 𝑟𝛥𝑦 determine the 
response to inflation, output and output change respectively. ?̅? is the steady state 
value of gross nominal interest rate.  ?̅? is the steady state value of inflation. 𝑌𝑡
∗ is 
the optional output. The monetary shock 𝜀𝑡
𝑟 follows a AR(1) process:  
𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡
𝑟 = 𝜌𝑟𝑙𝑛𝜀𝑡−1
𝑟 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑟                                                      (3.69) 
3.2.9 Net foreign assets 
Financial intermediaries sell domestic bonds to households and lend to 
entrepreneurs. All the financial intermediaries are assumed to operate at perfectly 
competitive market. Under the zero-profit assumption, in equilibrium the 
intermediaries lend all the funds obtained from households to entrepreneurs. 
Regarding to foreign Bond Market, the evolution of net foreign assets position 
can be derived in the following way. 
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝑏𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝑁𝑋𝑡                    (3.70) 
where 𝑁𝑋𝑡 is nominal domestic net exports in domestic currency. It can also be 
defined as the difference of nominal exports and nominal imports: 
𝑁𝑋𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡(𝑃𝑡
𝑑)
∗
(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
∗
− 𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓𝐶𝑡
𝑓                       (3.71) 
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Since the price of exports in domestic currency is given by 𝑆𝑡(𝑃𝑡
𝑑)
∗
= 𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑆𝑡
= 𝑃𝑡
𝑑, 
the price of imports and foreign bonds in domestic currency is given by 𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑓  𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡   
The evolution of net foreign assets over GDP can be expressed by:  
                    𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑏𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑑(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
∗
− 𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑓              
=> 𝑏𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓 +
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡
(𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
∗
− 𝐶𝑡
𝑓                   (3.72) 
In addition, when defining the net foreign assets position 𝑏𝑡
𝑓
 as a ratio of real 
foreign bonds value over the real GDP:  
?̂?𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑏𝑡
𝑓
𝑌𝑡
                                                (3.73) 
and expressing (𝐶𝑡
𝑑)
∗
 and 𝐶𝑡
𝑓
 by using 𝐸𝑋𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑡 respectively, it reads: 
?̂?𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 𝑎𝑡−1
𝑓 +
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑄𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑌𝑡
−
𝐼𝑀𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 
=> ?̂?𝑡
𝑓 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑓 )?̂?𝑡−1
𝑓 +
𝑝𝑡
𝑑
𝑄𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑌𝑡
−
𝐼𝑀𝑡
𝑌𝑡
                 (3.74) 
where 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑓 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑓 ) and 𝑝𝑡
𝑑 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑃𝑡
. 
In addition, according to Meenagh et al (2010) and Minford (2015), in order to 
ensure a balance growth equilibrium is reached, it requires the government will 
not run a trade surplus/deficit (in other words, lend to/borrow from aboard) 
forever. In some terminal time T → ∞ and real exchange rate 𝑄𝑇 is constant, the 
change in net foreign assets position as well as the ratio of net foreign assets 
position to GDP must equal to zero:  
𝛥?̂?𝑇
𝑓 = 𝛥 (
𝑏𝑇
𝑓
𝑌𝑇
) = 0                                    (3.75) 
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3.2.10 Resource constraint  
The resource constraint on final goods market can be obtained by combining 
household and government budget constraint and evolution of net foreign assets 
position with the zero-profit condition of the final goods producers and the 
employment agencies. The economy’s aggregate resource constraint reads: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝜓(𝑧𝑡)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑡
𝑒 + 𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀𝑡          (3.76) 
Since the exogenous government spending is set to be: 
𝐺𝑡 = (1 −
1
𝑔𝑡
) 𝑌𝑡                                    (3.77) 
where 𝑔𝑡 is the follows a AR(1) process: 
ln𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔ln𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑔                      (3.78) 
The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraint finally reads: 
𝑌𝑡 = (𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜓(𝑧𝑡)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑡
𝑒 + 𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀𝑡)𝑔𝑡        (3.79) 
 
3.2.11 Model without external finance premium 
In order to be able to evaluate the importance of financial frictions, it is also 
considered to compare the results of the model with financial accelerator 
mechanism to the alternative specification of the model when accelerator 
mechanism switched off. The model then will assume that capital producer is 
owned by household, as in SW07.  
The entrepreneurs can always obtain funds from household at cost of 𝑅𝑡, and the 
leverage ratio then will no longer influence the external finance premium and so 
the variable of entrepreneurial net worth is not needed in the model anymore. 
Furthermore, it introduces a capital stock accumulation decision directly in the 
household’s intertemporal optimization problem. This modification implies that 
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the Tobin’s Q defined in the simple model21: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑘 = 𝐸𝑡 [𝛽
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
(𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘 (1 − 𝛿) + 𝑅𝑡
𝑘𝑧𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝜓(𝑧𝑡)𝐾𝑡−1)]       (3.80) 
or in log-linearized form:  
𝑃𝑡
𝑘 =
(1 − 𝛿)
1 − 𝛿 + 𝑅∗𝐾
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑘 +
𝑅∗
𝐾
1 − 𝛿 + 𝑅∗𝐾
𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+1
𝑘 − (𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1)    (3.81) 
This satisfies the standard equality condition of equation when external finance 
premium 𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. ) = 0: 
𝐸𝑡𝐶𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡 [𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
]                       (3.82) 
Or in log-linearized form: 
𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1                          (3.83) 
 
3.3 Calibration 
In this section, we confront the model described in Section 3.2 with UK data. The 
model is calibrated to UK data over the period from 1975Q1 to 2015 Q4 at a 
quarterly frequency. All data sources are described in appendix, Table 3.2. It 
should be noted that this exercise is to provide some intuition for the results, and 
guides the choice of several key ‘structural shocks’ that are incorporated in the 
model.  
Before evaluating the log-linearized model, I first start with a set of structure 
parameters according to consensus values commonly used in the literature. There 
are two groups of parameters in calibration. The first group of parameters are 
important in determining the steady state of the model. For example, preference 
bias for the domestic and foreign produced goods or steady state inflation and 
                                                          
21 This expression of Tobin’s Q is identical to SW07 that defined as the ratio of two Lagrange multiplier 
associated with budget constraint and capital accumulation equation, respectively.   
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output growth. I use calibration values either directly from that study of UK data 
or used to matched the steady-state of our model in the reference. The second 
group of parameters govern the dynamics of the model and there is a general 
consensus for estimates of some parameters. For example, the coefficients of the 
monetary policy rule or parameters related to price and wage stickiness. I then 
make use of a range of estimates for the United States and the euro area using 
models with very similar structures to our own. Then these unconditional 
structural parameters of the model of interest are re-evaluated and re-estimated by 
Indirect Inference estimate by matching the properties of empirical data and 
simulated data using auxiliary model in Chapter 4.  
Since model period corresponds to a quarter so the discount factor 𝛽 is set at 0.998 
corresponding to a steady state annualized real interest rate of 4%22, as in the data. 
The quarterly capital depreciation rate 𝛿 is set equal to 0.025 following in SW07 
to produce a 10% annual depreciation rate and the share of capital in the 
production function is set at 0.3. Share of fixed costs in production (𝛷 − 1) equals 
to 0.5. The degree of habit formation in consumption ℎ equals 0.7 indicated by 
SW07 and Adolfson et al. (2007). The value of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution 𝜎𝑐 and elasticity of labour supply 𝜎𝑙 are within the range of values 
indicated by SW03 for Euro area, equal 1.39 and 2.83 respectively 23 . The 
elasticity of capital adjustment cost is set equal to 5.47 and the elasticity of capital 
utilisation cost equals to 0.54, in line with Le et al (2012). Following SW07, the 
probability of a retailer being unable to re-optimize its price equals 0.67. This 
implies that the average duration of retail price for a certain variety is three 
quarters (i.e. 
1
1−𝜉𝑝
=  3), whilst setting a degree of inflation indexation follows the 
estimation results of SW equals to 0.43. The degree of wage stickiness equals to 
0.70 (
1
1−𝜉𝑝
=3.33) and the degree of wage index indexation equals to 0.58. 
                                                          
22 ?̅? =
1
𝛽
= 1.0101, it is equivalent to 4% annually.  
23 The inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 𝜎𝑐 is set to 0.72 in SW07 for US and 0.74 in SW03 
for Euro area. This indicates  𝜎𝑐 is set at 
1
0.72
= 1.35 for US and  
1
0.74
= 1.39 for EU. On the other hand, the 
𝜎𝑙 is 
1
0.54
= 1.83 for US and 
1
0.42
= 2.38 for EU. Here I take the starting calibration value for EU.  
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Proportion of sticky wages and proportion of sticky prices are set equal to 0.10 
and 0.40 respectively, in line with the empirical evidence of Le et al (2012).  
In the extension to the financial section setup, the survival rate of entrepreneurs 𝜃 
is set equal to 0.99, in line with Le et al (2012). This implies the average duration 
of entrepreneurs is more than 6 years (i.e. 25 quarters: 
1
1−𝜃
=  25 ). This target is 
taken from Bernanke et al. (1999), which is close to the estimation after Christiano 
et al. (2010).  Elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage then equals to 
0.04.  
The parameters pertaining to the foreign sector is set mainly relying on the 
empirical evidence of Minford (1984), Meenagh et al. (2010, 2012) and Minford 
(2015) based on UK data. Preference bias for the domestic, 𝜔  and foreign 
produced goods, 𝜔𝑓, are both set at 0.7. 𝜎, the elasticity of marginal substitution 
between the domestic consumption bundle and the imported variety of goods is 
set equal to 1 assuming that the UK’s products compete but not sensitively with 
foreign alternatives, whereas the equivalent substitution elasticity in the foreign 
country 𝜎𝑓 equals to 0.7. In the monetary policy rule, I assume the conventional 
coefficients of inflation, persistence and output gap are 1, 0.8 and 0.11, 
respectively.  
The models are also calibrated to hit certain real and financial ratios based on 
empirical data for the UK. The real part of the economy is governed mainly by 
four parameters, which pin down four steady state proportions. The quarterly 
steady state inflation based on average value equals to 1.29, and quarterly steady-
state output growth is 0.55. It is assumed to set to achieve a steady state 
government spending to output ratio of 0.20. The steady state values of 
components of output therefore are calculated as: the steady state value of the 
investment-to-output ratio, 
𝐼
𝑌
, equals to 0.18, the consumption-to-output ratio, 
𝐶
𝑌
 
equals to 0.58, 
𝐸𝑋
𝑌
 equals to 0.24 and 
𝐼𝑀
𝑌
 equals to 0.25, respectively.  
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According to SW07 and de Walque et al. (2006), the curvature of Kimball (1995) 
aggregator 𝜖𝑝 / 𝜖𝑤  is defined as the elasticity of the price/wage elasticity of 
demand with respect to relative price/wage at steady-state. Goods Market and 
labour market curvature of the Kimball (1995) Aggregator are all setting equal to 
10 as in SW07.   
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Table 3.1: Structural parameters 
Parameters Values Description 
Fixed 
𝛽 0.998 Discount rate 
𝛿 0.025 Capital depreciation rate 
Households 
𝜎𝑐 1.39 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
ℎ 0.70 degree of External habit formation 
𝜉𝑤 0.70 degree of wage stickiness 
𝜎𝐿 1.83 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
𝜔𝑤 0.10 Proportion of sticky wages 
𝜄𝑤 0.58 Degree of wage indexation  
Producers 
𝜄𝑝 0.24 Degree of price indexation 
 𝜓 0.54 Elasticity of capital utilization 
𝛷 1.50 1+Share of fixed costs in production  
𝜑 5.74 Steady state elasticity of capital 
adjustment  
𝛼 0.33 Share of capital in production 
𝜔𝑟 0.40 Proportion of sticky prices 
𝜉𝑝 0.75 Degree of price stickiness 
Taylor rule 
𝑟𝑝 2.50 Response to inflation  
𝜌 0.60 Interest rate smoothing 
𝑟𝑦 0.08 Response to output 
𝑟𝛥𝑦 0.22 Response to output change 
Financial frictions 
𝜒 0.04 Elasticity of the premium with respect to 
leverage 
𝜃 0.99 Survival rate of entrepreneurs 
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Table 2 Steady state values in model economy 
𝑅𝑘
∗  0.04 Return rate of capital 
?̅? 0.55 Quarterly output growth 
?̅? 1.29 Quarterly inflation 
𝐺
𝑌
 
0.20 Government spending to GDP ratio 
𝐶
𝑌
 
0.58 Consumption to GDP ratio 
𝐼
𝑌
 
0.18 Investment to GDP ration 
𝐸𝑋
𝑌
 
0.24 Export to GDP ratio 
𝐼𝑀
𝑌
 
0.25 Import to GDP ratio 
𝐶𝑒
𝑌
 
0.008 Net worth to GDP ratio 
𝑒𝑝 10 Goods market curvature of the Kimball 
aggregator 
𝑒𝑤 10 Labour market curvature of the Kimball 
aggregator 
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3.4 Impulse response functions for structural shocks 
This section briefly examines the impulse response24 of the model economy to a 
set of shocks. The impulse responses of macroeconomic and financial variables 
to a 10 percent rise in a variety of structural shocks are plotted in Figure 3.1 
through Figure 3.5 of Appendix. A 10 percent rise in a variable is denoted as 0.1 
on the y-axis and the number of quarters elapsed since the shock begins are 
indicated on the x-axis. The solid line presents the full SWBGG model and the 
dash-circle line presents the SW model when external finance premium switched 
off. 
The IRFs are built using calibrated coefficients and corresponding parameters of 
shock processes over the sample. The analysis therefore only helps to assess the 
validity of the model and highlights and helps to understand the key differences 
in the amplification and propagation mechanisms embedded in various setups. A 
detailed discussion would be provided in Chapter 4 where the IRFs then would be 
constructed base on re-estimated coefficients.   
Figure 3.1 depicts the impulse response to a positive 10% non-stationary 
productivity shock. A non-stationary productivity shock has permeant impact on 
real variables including output, consumption investment etc., and leads to a 
decrease in prices due to the expansion in aggregate supply. Investment and 
consumption also increase due to the expansion in output. Since the monetary 
policy is operating, the nominal interest rate decreases as shown in Figure. In the 
SWBGG model there is a decrease of the external finance premium and hence 
there is a dampening of the investment response presented compared to that in the 
SW model. Figure 3.2 shows the impulse response to a positive 10% 
contractionary monetary policy shock. As seen in figure, through the standard 
transmission mechanism, nominal interest rises with output, consumption, 
                                                          
24 The plotted IRFs are calculated from the differences between the base run and simulated results after a one 
-off shock in the first simulation period. The base run results is the solution without any shocks so that it 
replicates the original data set. 
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investment, labour hours fall dramatically on impact. With the financial friction 
switching on, the transmission mechanism of the policy shock is enhanced. The 
mechanism is evident. When the shock hits the economy, since the net worth falls 
due to the declining return to capital rate, price of capital decline further in the 
SWBGG model, the external finance premium then increases, which reinforces a 
further contraction in capital and investment. Figure 3.3 plots the impulse 
response to a positive 10% investment specific shock. It is a demand shock that 
increases investment, while decreases the Tobin’s Q. Capital stock and the 
aggregate output increase and because investment grows. With the presence of 
financial frictions, it attenuates the fall in investment and output. The investment 
specific shock gives rise to a pro-cyclical external premium. Figure 3.4 plots the 
impulse response to a positive 10% external finance premium shock. A positive 
external finance premium shock increases the cost of funds borrowing. This 
should cause a decrease in capital stock and investment as shown in figure. Net 
worth declines due to the increase in external finance premium.  The role of other 
shocks in the cyclicality in the premium can also be inferred from related studies 
(Christensen and Dib, 2008, De Graeve 2008, le et al., 2013, Villa, 2013, Cristina 
2016, etc.).  
3.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this research is to discover how far the banking crises have been caused 
by financial shocks on the UK economy. To this start, this chapter lays out a new 
Keynesian DSGE model economy with the addition of the BGG financial 
accelerator mechanism, and small open economy setup to make the analysis more 
relevant to the UK. Dynamic properties also have been illustrated through the 
impulse response functions from a one-off policy shock. By using an alternative 
simple model when the financial friction setup is switched off as a comparison, in 
particular, we see the amplification response of investment to monetary policy 
shock and attenuation response to productivity and investment supply shock in 
the economy when the financial friction has been considered. However, this 
conclusion from the IRFs analysis may not be highly reliable empirically because 
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the calibration from other studies mainly based on US and EA data, and therefore 
it is worthy of further interrogation, to discover what it implies about the sources 
and nature of the crisis seriously. This would be done in empirical work in the 
following Chapter 4 for further evaluation and re-estimation. 
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Appendix 3.A Data source and Figures 
Table 3. 2 Data source, definition and derivation 
Variable Notation Source, (Code) Definition and Derivation 
Nominal interest rate 𝑅 BoE, (IUQAAJNB) Quarterly 3 month average sterling T-bill / 4 
Output 𝑌 ONS, (ABMI) Gross domestic product, SA,CP 
Consumption 𝐶 ONS, (ABJR) Household final consumption expenditure, SA,CP 
Investment 𝐼 ONS, (NPQT+CPAU) Total fixed capital formation + Changes in inventories, SA,CP 
Price level 𝜋 ONS, (CGBV) Percentage change in GDP deflator, Quarterly 
Labour hours 𝐿 ONS, (MGRZ/YBUS) Employment/Total actual weekly hours worked 
Capital 𝐾 N/A Derived from investment Euler equation  
Price of Capital 𝑃𝑘 N/A Derived from equation  
Real wage 𝑊 ONS, (ROYJ/ YBUS) Wage and Salaries/ Total actual weekly hours worked, divided by GDP deflator 
Capital Rental rate 𝑅𝑘 N/A Derived from equation  
External finance premium 𝐶𝑌 Reuters, DataStream  Difference between prime banking lending rate and bank official rate 
Entrepreneur Net worth 𝑁 Reuters DataStream FTSE all share index, divided by the GDP deflator. 
Export 𝐸𝑋 ONS, (IKBE) Total exports, SA, CP 
Import 𝐼𝑀 ONS,(IKBF) Total imports, SA, CP 
Real exchange rate 𝑄 BoE, (XUQABK67) Inverse of quarterly average sterling effective exchange rate 
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Net foreign bond position 𝑏𝑓 ONS, (AA6H) Current account balance as per cent of GDP, SA 
Foreign consumption 𝐶𝑓 Reuters DataStream Weighted average of consumption: US (0.6), Germany (0.19) and Japan (0.21) 
Foreign price level 𝑃𝑓 Reuters DataStream Weighted average of CPI: US (0.6), Germany (0.19) and Japan (0.21) 
Foreign interest rate 𝑅𝑓 Reuters DataStream Weighted average of interest rate: US (0.6), Germany (0.19) and Japan (0.21) 
Total labour force  ONS, (BCJD+DYDC) Total claim account + Work force jobs 
† SA = Seasonal Adjusted, CP = Current Price, Total labour force is used to scale the data as per capita. 
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Figure 2.3.1 IRFs to Productivity shock  
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Figure 3.2 IRFs to monetary policy shock 
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Figure 4.3.3  IRFs to investment shock 
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Figure 5.3.4   IRFs to external finance premium shock 
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Figure 6.3.5 IRFs to export demand shock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
6
8
x 10
-3 rk
0 5 10 15 20 25
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10
-3 premium
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
networth
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
export
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
import
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
real exchange
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
foreign assets/GDP ratio
 
 
SWBGG
SW
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 x 10 
-3 interest rate 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -0.025 
-0.02 
-0.015 
-0.01 
-0.005 
0 investment 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -0.03 
-0.025 
-0.02 
-0.015 
-0.01 
-0.005 
0 tobins Q  
0 5 10 15 20 25 -6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 x 10 
-3 capital 
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 x 10 
-3 inflation 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 x 10 
-3 wage 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 x 10 
-3 consumption 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -5 
0 
5 
10 x 10 
-3 output 
0 5 10 15 20 25 -2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 x 10 
-3 Labour hours 
71 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix 3.B  
Log-linearized model list 
Resource constraint  
𝑦𝑡 =
𝑐
𝑦
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑖
𝑦
𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑔𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑦
𝑅𝐾𝑧𝑡 +
𝑐𝑒
𝑦
𝑐𝑡
𝑒 +
𝑥
𝑦
𝑥𝑡 −
𝑚
𝑦
𝑚𝑡    
𝑐
𝑦
= 1 −
𝑔
𝑦
−
𝑖
𝑦
−
𝑥
𝑦
+
𝑚
𝑦
  
𝑖
𝑦
= (𝛾 − 1 − 𝛿)
𝑘
𝑦
  
Consumption Euler Equation 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐1𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑐2𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑡+1 + 𝑐3(𝑙𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑙𝑡+1) − 𝑐4(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑒𝑏𝑡  
𝑐1 =
ℎ
𝛾
1+
ℎ
𝛾
𝑐𝑡−1; 𝑐2 = 
1
1+
ℎ
𝛾
;   𝑐3 =
(𝜎𝑐−1)(
𝑊∗
ℎ𝐿∗
𝐶∗
)
1+
ℎ
𝛾
;   𝑐4 = (
1−
ℎ
𝛾
1+
ℎ
𝛾
𝜎𝑐
)  
Investment Euler Equation 
𝑖𝑡 =
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
[𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛾
(1−𝜎𝑐)𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 +
1
𝛾2𝜑
𝑝𝑡
𝑘] + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Aggregate production function 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜙[𝛼𝑘𝑡
𝑠 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑎𝑡]  
Relationship between effectively rented capital and capital  
𝑘𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑡  
Degree of capital utilization 
𝑧𝑡 =
1−𝜓
𝜓
 𝑟𝑘𝑡  
Capital accumulation equation 
𝑘𝑡 = (
1−𝛿
𝛾
) 𝑘𝑡−1 + (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) 𝑖𝑡 + (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) ((1 + 𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐))𝛾2𝜑)𝑒𝑖𝑡    
Hybrid Keynesian Phillips curve 
𝜋𝑡
𝑁𝐾 =
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 +
𝜄𝑝
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
𝜋𝑡−1 −
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷−1)𝑒𝑝)
) (𝛼𝑟𝑡
𝑘 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝑤𝑡 − 𝑒𝑎𝑡) − 𝑒𝑝𝑡  
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𝜋𝑡
𝑁𝐶 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑤𝑡 + 𝛼𝑟𝑡
𝑘 − 𝑒𝑎𝑡  
𝜋𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑤𝑝𝜋𝑡
𝑁𝐾 + (1 − 𝑤𝑝)𝜋𝑡
𝑁𝐶  
Hybrid wage setting equation 
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐾 =
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
𝐸𝑡𝑤𝑡+1 +
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
𝑤𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 −
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
𝜋𝑡 −
𝜄𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
𝜋𝑡−1 −
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑤−1)𝜖𝑤)
)(𝑤𝑡−𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑡 − (
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
)(𝑐𝑡 −
ℎ
𝛾
𝑐𝑡−1)) + 𝑒𝑤𝑡  
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐶 = 𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑡 − (
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
)(𝑐𝑡 −
ℎ
𝛾
𝑐𝑡−1) − (𝜋𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡) + 𝑒𝑤𝑡
𝑠  
𝑤𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐾 + (1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐶  
Labour demand (hours) equation 
𝑙𝑡 = −𝑤𝑡 + (1 +
1−𝜓
𝜓
) 𝑟𝑘𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡−1  
Monetary policy Taylor rule 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜌𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑟𝑝𝜋𝑡 + 𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑡) + 𝑟∆𝑦(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1) + 𝑒𝑟𝑡  
External finance premium equation 
𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) = 𝜒(𝑞𝑞𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡 − 𝑛𝑤𝑡) + 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡  
Arbitrage equation for the value of capital (Tobin’s Q): 
𝑝𝑡
𝑘 =
1−𝛿
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑡+1
𝑘 +
𝑅𝐾
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡+1   
The evolution of entrepreneur’s net worth  
𝑛𝑤𝑡 =  𝜃𝑛𝑤𝑡−1 +
𝐾
𝑁
(𝑐𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑐𝑦𝑡) + 𝐸𝑡−1𝑐𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑡  
Real uncovered interest rate parity   
𝑞𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑟𝑡  
Export demand equation  
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡
𝑓 +
1
𝜔
𝜎𝑓𝑞𝑡 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡  
Import demand equation 
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𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 − 𝜎𝑞𝑡 + 𝑒𝑚𝑡  
 
The evolution of net foreign assets position 
?̂?𝑡
𝑓 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
)?̂?𝑡−1
𝑓 +
𝑝𝑡
𝑑
𝑞𝑡
𝑥
𝑦
𝑒𝑥𝑡 +
𝑝𝑡
𝑑
𝑞𝑡
𝑥
𝑦
1
𝜔
𝑞𝑡 −
𝑚
𝑦
𝑚𝑡  
Stochastic process  
Government spending shock  
𝑒𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑔𝜂𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑔
  
Risk premium shock  
𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑏  
Productivity shock  
(𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑒𝑎𝑡−1) = 𝜌𝑎(𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑒𝑎𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑎  
Investment-specific shock  
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑖   
Monetary policy shock  
𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑟  
Price mark-up shock  
𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑝
  
Wage mark-up shock  
𝑒𝑤𝑡 = 𝜌𝑤𝑒𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑤  
Labour supply shock  
𝑒𝑤𝑡
𝑠 = 𝜌𝑤
𝑠 𝑒𝑤𝑡−1
𝑠 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑤𝑠  
External finance premium shock  
𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡 = 𝜌𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑝𝑟
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Net worth shock  
𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑡 = 𝜌𝑛𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑛𝑤  
Export demand shock  
𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑥  
Import demand shock 
𝑒𝑚𝑡 = 𝜌𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑚  
Exogenous foreign consumption process  
𝑐𝑡
𝑓 = 𝜌𝑐
𝑓𝑐𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑐𝑓
  
Exogenous foreign interest rate process  
𝑟𝑡
𝑓 = 𝜌𝑟
𝑓𝑟𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑟𝑓
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Chapter 4 Evaluate and Estimate a DSGE model with financial 
frictions for the UK: An Indirect Inference method  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
From the end of the early 1990s recession, the UK economy had experienced a steady growth 
in output, accompanied by low inflation and unemployment rate. However, the global financial 
crisis metamorphosed from the 2007 financial crisis in the US to many other advanced 
economies resulting in a so-called the ‘Great Recession’. In particular, in line with the US, the 
UK has recently experienced the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1920s and 
1930s. The ‘Great recession’ of 2008 and 2009 brought to an end the longest period of sustained, 
stable economic growth the UK has known with one of its sharpest contractions. 
 
This paper targets two important challenges faced in DSGE model literatures. First, despite the 
advances of Bayesian techniques mentioned the DSGE model literature, while reported 
confidence sets for DSGE model parameters are often narrow, hence estimates of many 
important parameters tend to be fragile across empirical studies (Schorfheide 2008). Second, 
researchers usually use de-trending time series data before estimate the model.  However, first 
differencing filter passes the higher frequency data behaviour and attenuates the lower 
frequency behaviour of the data, while moving average filter passes the lower frequency 
behaviour but blocks higher frequency behaviour, thus smooths the data. Eliminating or 
amplifying dynamics over certain frequency range can leaves potentially non-negligible 
influence of permanent shocks in the stationary detrended data. Time series exhibit either 
higher or lower frequency behaviour is difficult to reconcile with the model being estimated. 
This data frequency misspecification contaminates the estimation of shocks and thereby 
inference about the sources of business cycle fluctuations. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, this appropriately complex 
medium-sized model of a small open economy incorporates important nominal and real 
rigidities as well as the financial frictions and foreign sector. This then allows us to describe 
the UK economy in a reasonable detail. On the other hand, we evaluation and estimate the 
model by Indirect Inference method using un-filtered nonstationary data in the period of 
1975Q1 to 2015Q4.  
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We find the model with or without financial frictions are severely rejected using calibrated 
parameters. This indicates both models cannot explain the data behaviour. It is obviously that 
we attempt to evaluate the model based on unreasonable values for some parameters. When we 
therefore re-estimate structural parameters by Indirect Inference method, the overall 
performance of modelling fitting dramatically increases with the model significantly pass the 
Indirect Inference test.  Moreover, the estimation results are also robust to the period from 1992 
to 2015 under the inflation targeting monetary policy regime.  
We also document the effects of shocks to key macroeconomics variables and then assess the 
role of different shock to combat the financial crisis. We find that a) the non-financial shock, 
especially the productivity and labour supply shock are the primarily driver forces of real 
variables variability. b) The financial shocks also played an important role in the 2008 drop of 
the output. c) Financial shocks are an important source of financial variable fluctuations. d) 
With the existence of financial friction, demand shocks, in particular the investment shocks 
have been partially replaced by exogenous disturbances introduced by financial shocks. 
Investment shock is also relegated to account for a small fraction of the variance in nominal 
variables and entrepreneurs’ net worth. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 describe the model evaluation and estimate 
procedure. I report the evaluation and estimation results in Section 3. In Section 4, I study the 
empirical performance by accessing IRFS and the relative importance of each shock and 
propagation of financial shocks. I also assess the robustness check for alternative monetary 
regime and nominal debt contractor. Section 5 concludes.  
 
4.2 Indirect Inference  
 
4.2.1 Why indirect inference? 
Schorfheide (2008) investigates for instance the specification of the Phillips curve and find a 
wide range of estimated parameter among 43 surveys is because of differences in model 
specification, choice of observables and sample period, data definitions, and data detrending. 
He argued the fragility of estimates is partly due to lack of identification25 of key DSGE model 
parameters.  
                                                          
25 Canova and Sala (2009) document identification problems in popular New Keynesian DSGE models. 
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Over the past decades numerous econometric procedures for the analysis and estimates of 
DSGE models have been developed. 26  Amongst those, Bayesian method is widely used.  
Blanchard (2016) criticized the standard method of estimation, which is a mix of calibration 
and Bayesian techniques, is also unconvincing. The problems of Bayesian approach are 
twofold. The first problem is that misspecification of part of the model affects estimation of 
the parameters in other parts of the model. The other problem comes a number of parameters 
are set a priori, through calibration. However, in many cases, the justification for the tight prior 
is weak, and what is estimated reflects more the prior of the researcher than the likelihood 
function.   
Besides Bayesians techniques, researchers have used maximum likelihood (ML), generalized 
method of moments (GMM to estimate DSGE models. However, whether ML or GMM is 
being used, these estimators are relying on the same sample and theoretical information about 
first moments to identify DSGE model parameters. It is apparent that the assumption of a true 
model binds the identification problem to the issue of DSGE model misspecification. It is 
unsure that any parameters of a DSGE model can be identified when the model is mis-specified.  
A response to the identification problems is Indirect Inference (II) techniques. It is a 
methodology has been well explored in the classical literature but has received substantially 
less attention in the Bayesian paradigm. Smith (1993) and Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault 
(1993) noted that II yields an estimator and specification tests whose asymptotic properties are 
standard even though the true likelihood of the DSGE model is not known. Although 
applications of Indirect Inference methods have appeared in diverse areas in economics, the 
approach has not been widely incorporated into standard econometric software packages27. 
This is in part, due to the requirement that the package incorporates a flexible compute language. 
The II method used here is that originally proposed in Meenagh et al. (2009a) and subsequently 
refined by Le et al. (2011) using Monte Carlo experiments, these studies extend the II estimator 
by acknowledging that the DSGE model is false and found the power of the indirect inference 
tests are by far the greatest. Indirect inference technique is an intuitive and powerful way to 
organize estimation of deep parameters in complex models. Analysts often specify a model that 
relates parameters and exogenous variables of an economic model to some set of observable 
variables. In many situations, the economic model is too complicated to admit useful 
expressions for the probability distributions associated with the endogenous variables. Even 
                                                          
26 See Canova (2007) and DeJong and Dave (2007) provide a detailed overview 
27 There is a programme package based on MATLAB is available for downloading from:  
 http://patrickminford.net/Indirect/index.html. Le et al (2016) also provided a detailed user’s manual.   
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expressions for expectations of functions of the data may not exist. In such cases, fully efficient 
estimation procedures, such as ML, may not be applicable. In following, we would discuss the 
Indirect Inference in detail.   
 
4.2.2 Introduction of Indirect Inference 
The method of indirect inference is first proposed by Smith (1993) and further developed by 
Gourieroux, Monford and Renault (1993). It is widely known in the literature of estimation 
(e.g. Smith (1993); Gregory and Smith 1991, 1993; Gourieroux et al. 1993; Gourieroux and 
Montfort 1995; and, Canova 2005) and can be viewed as a generalization of the simulated 
method of moments. The II method is then extended to evaluate an already estimated or 
calibrated structural model.  
The basic idea underlying indirect inference is to use an auxiliary model that is completely 
independent of the theoretical model to produce a description of the data against which the 
performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly to form a criterion function. The insight is 
then that the parameters of the auxiliary model can be estimated using both the observed data 
and data simulated from the structural model. The indirect inference estimator then acts as a 
minimum distance estimator that entails minimizing the difference between these two sets of 
estimates in a suitable metric. The parameters of the auxiliary model can be estimated by quasi-
maximum likelihood.  
When using indirect inference for evaluating a structural model, it can simulate the data from 
the macroeconomic model when given the parameters of the macroeconomic model and the 
distributions of the errors. Structural parameters are chosen so that when this model is 
simulated to generate estimates of the auxiliary model the results are similar to those obtained 
from the actual data.  Consider an observed dataset taking values in y of dimension n assumed 
to have arisen from a structural model with the probability density function 𝑓(𝑦𝑡|𝛽), where 𝛽 
is the parameter vector of this model. Suppose that one can also specify a second statistical 
model that has a tractable probability density function. It defines the density function of this 
auxiliary model by 𝑝(𝑦𝑡|𝜃), where 𝜃 denotes the parameter vector of this auxiliary model. The 
auxiliary model is defined to maximise a criterion function depending on the observed data and 
could be purely a data analytic model that does not offer any mechanistic explanation of how 
the observed data arose.  
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One then draws s independent replicates of data simulated from the structural model, which 
denotes 𝑥𝑡(𝛽) and we assume a particular value of 𝛽 given by 𝛽0 such that {𝑥𝑡(𝛽0)}𝑠=1
𝑆  and 
{𝑦𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇  have the same distribution. However, for it to work well, two requirements need to be 
satisfied: (1) it is possible to simulate data from the structural model given the values of its 
parameters and (2) the auxiliary model captures important aspect of the data and is easy to 
estimate. The parameters of auxiliary model can be estimated using the observed data by 
maximizing the log of the likelihood function 𝑝(𝑦𝑡|𝜃) to obtain parameter estimates 𝜃𝑇 given 
by: 
𝜃 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜃
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑡=1 𝑝(𝑦𝑡|𝜃)                                               (4.1) 
where 𝜃 serves to capture certain features of the observed data, in general it is an inconsistent 
estimator of 𝛽.  
One then applies the estimation procedure to simulated paths. As explained above, using the 
structural model under 𝑓(𝑦𝑡|𝛽), it is to simulate S paths of length T by drawing independently 
𝑆×𝑇 times and generate pseudo observations, {𝑥𝑡(𝜃)}𝑠=1
𝑆  by setting some initial values for the 
variables and the parameters.   
One in turn applies the estimation procedure and the likelihood function based on the 
simulation given by:  
?̃?(𝛽)  = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜃 
∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝑝(𝑥𝑡(𝛽)|𝜃)]
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑆
𝑠=1                                (4.2) 
The indirect inference estimator will try to 𝛽 so that ?̃?(𝛽) is as close as possible to 𝜃. It is based 
on the finding function and the simulated quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (SQMLE) of 𝛽 
is given by: 
𝑏(𝛽) = argmax
𝛽 
∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑝(𝑦𝑡|?̃?(𝛽) )]
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑆
𝑠=1                            (4.3) 
Since the value of 𝛽 produces a value of 𝜃 that maximises the likelihood function using the 
observed data. Suppose that the data really are generated under the parameter 𝜃, we then expect 
that the observed data and the simulated data are such that 𝜃 satisfies the sufficient condition: 
𝜃 = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃 = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 ?̃?(𝛽)                                                      (4.4) 
This means the set of parameterised auxiliary model have to be rich enough to capture the 
essential feature of the data or distinguish the difference values of generative parameters. 
Therefore it needs at least as many auxiliary parameters as those of generative model and one 
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assume that the dimensionality of the auxiliary model parameter is at least as large as the 
dimensionality of the generative model parameter, i.e. dim(𝜃) ≥ dim(𝛽). 
 
4.2.3 The testing procedure 
The application of model evaluation by indirect inference method is originally proposed in 
Meenagh et al. (2009a), and subsequently refined by Le et al. (2011) using Monte Carlo 
experiments and in Le et al (2014) for the application to non-stationary data. Therefore, for an 
exhaustive description of the testing procedure, I refer the reader to the original papers. The 
following is a brief procedure for the application to DSGE model by non-stationary data. 
Step 1: Calculate shock processes 
The residuals from structural model together with exogenous variable processes need to 
calculate to produce the shocks processes that drives the model. We then compute 
corresponding coefficients (persistence of shock process) and the innovation of shock process 
conditiaonal on actual data and calibrated parameters to account for autoregressive behaviours.  
Step 2: Derive the simulated data by bootstrapping 
According to Meenagh and Minford (2012), in order to obtain the bootstraps, the innovations 
are first bootstrapped by time vector and add back to shock processes. Shock processes are then 
drawn in an overlapping manner and add into the model base run. For period t = 1, one vector 
of shocks is drawn and added into the model base run, given its initial lagged values; the model 
is solved for period 1 and this becomes the lagged variable vector for period t = 2. Then the 
second vector of shocks is drawn after replacement for period t = 2 and added into this solution 
for period 1; the model is then solved for period t = 2 and this in turn becomes the lagged 
variable vector for period 3. Hence, the process is repeated for onwards until the bootstrapping 
reached for a full sample size. The sequences of shock processes generate S bootstrap 
simulations and in this study, S is set equal to 1000.  
The DSGE model presented is solved in log linearized equations using projection methods28 
applied by Minford (1984,1986) which bears a similarity to that of the extended path algorithm 
originally presented in Fair and Taylor (1983). The idea basically, was to solve for a terminal 
                                                          
28 See Villaverde et al (2016) for a comparative survey of solution and estimation techniques for dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models.  
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condition far into the future data to reflect the equilibrium properties of the model as suggested 
by Minford et al. (1979). This implied the terminal conditions in a way analogous to the 
transversality conditions set in infinite time horizon problems (equation (3.75)), and implies 
that the model will have reached an equilibrium solution by the terminal date.  
The method of solution first generates a base run that simulation results are set exactly equal 
to the actual data over the sample. This is to compute (Type II) residuals that reflect differences 
between the actual data and the value generated from Type II iterations (according to Fair and 
Taylor (1983)’s definition). After obtaining the 1000 different simulated scenarios (1000 
simulations for selected variables are shown in Figure 4.16 in Appendix B by adding 
bootstrapped shocks from original data in the base run, it then computes the differences 
between the simulation data and original data to get the effects of these bootstrapped shocks. 
It then adds back the effects of deterministic trends (BGP) on the effects of the shocks and 
estimates the auxiliary model on all pseudo-samples. The full sample size of simulated data 
and the actual data has to be consistent.  
Step 3: Compute the Wald statistic 
Under the null hypothesis, the true economic model is the structural model with the given 
estimates. Deciding whether to reject or not reject the null hypothesis requires the estimation 
of the auxiliary model with simulated data. Here, a Wald test statistic is chosen to be the test 
statistic. One can apply the OLS estimates to the auxiliary model and compute both parameter 
vector from the actual data and the set of parameter vectors of pseudo samples and to obtain 
their distribution, from which one obtain corresponding estimated coefficient 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑠(𝛽), 
respectively, where define 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  as the average value that is computed from: 
𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
1000
∑ 𝜃𝑠(𝛽)
1000
𝑠=1                                                        (4.5) 
The Wald statistic is to choose a suitable metric for measuring the distance between two set of 
parameters and the formula is specified as: 
𝑊 = (𝜃 − 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )′Ω(𝛽)−1(𝜃 − 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )                                          (4.6)           
where Ω(𝛽) the variance and covariance matrix of (𝜃𝑠(𝛽) − 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). This process measures the 
distance that the actual estimated paremeters are from the average of the simulated ones. The 
following step is to access the combinations of all estimated coefficient the model can fit. For 
the model to fit the data at the 95% confidence level, it requires the Wald statistic for the actual 
data to be less than the 95% confidence level of the Wald statistics from the simulated data. 
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One can present a straightforward statistic by either a P-value29 or transforming the Wald result 
a normalised t-statistic30.  
 
Figure 4.1The steps for estimating strutrual paramters of a DSGE model in II estimate 
 
                                                    
 
Observed Data                                      Simulated Data 
 
 
𝜃                                                                𝜃(𝛽) = 𝜃(𝛽)1,𝜃(𝛽)2, … ,𝜃(𝛽)𝑠                                𝛽   
Statistics on empirical                               Statistics on simulated  
auxiliary model                                          auxiliary model 
  
                                                          
29 The P value = (100 − Wald percentile)/100 
30 The transformed Mahalanobis distance can be computed as: 
 T = 1.645 ∗
√2𝑊𝑎−√2𝑘
√2𝑊95−√2𝑘
    
where Wa is the Wald statistic on the actual data and W95 is the Wald statistic for the 95% of the simulated data. If the null 
hypothesis has not been rejected by the data, the transformed Mahalanobis distance should be less than 1.645. The way is 
normalised following Le et al. (2012), and Meenagh and Le (2013), so that the resulting t-statistic is 1.645 at the 95% point 
the distribution, and thus anything falling beyond would lead to the rejection of the model. 
Conversion of data to auxiliary statistics 
Minimize (𝜃 − 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )′Ω(𝛽)−1(𝜃 − 𝜃(𝛽)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
Model of Interest  
DSGE Model 
Optimization iterations until 
Wald is minimized 
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4.2.4 Indirect Inference Estimation 
 
Estimation by indirect inference is the optimal choice of parameters for the macroeconomic 
model so that the distance of those two estimates of the parameters of the auxiliary model is 
minimized. In order to find the minimised distance of those two estimates of the coefficients 
in the quadratic form (4.2), I use the algorithm based on Simulated Annealing31 (SA) in which 
search takes place over a wide range around the initial values, with optimising search 
accompanied by random jumps around the parameter space32. The use of SA attempts to imply 
the II estimation into practice. It exploits an analogy between the way in which a metal freezes 
into a minimum energy crystalline structure and search for a minimum in a more general system. 
Such process in SA can be considered as the way of finding the minimum Wald statistics 
implied by the observed and simulated data. At each step, the SA heuristic considers some 
neighbouring states of the current states, and decides between moving the system to other states 
or staying in states. These probabilities ultimately lead the system to move to states of lower 
Wald statistics. Typically, this iteration until the quadratic form is minimised, or until a given 
computation budget has been exhausted.  
SA’s major advantage over other methods is its ability to avoid becoming trapped at local 
minima. It then loops over the testing procedure to search for the global minima of Wald 
statistic. Under the SA algorithm, an initial choice of parameter vector is chosen, and the Wald 
at that point is evaluated by running through steps 1-3 above. The algorithm then moves 
randomly to try a new point in the parameter space. When a new point in the parameter space 
is found to have a smaller Wald than any point preceding it in the sequence, it is chosen to be 
the current point from which the search for the minimum proceeds. The algorithm can also 
move to points which have a larger Wald, although the probability of this happening decreases 
with the number of points at which Wald statistics have previously been evaluated. Eventually, 
after a certain number of best points are found, the search is once again widened by increasing 
the acceptance probability. There are many different available stopping rules for the algorithm. 
In this study, the bounds are set to be within 30% of the initial calibrated parameters, and the 
maximum number of iterations is set to be equal to 1000.  
The steps for estimating strutrual paramters of a DSGE model in II estimation is shown in 
Figure 4.1. It should be noted that II estimate is the point esitmate, by defiiniton a point estimate 
                                                          
31 The estimation is mainly based on Matlab code file ‘run_CalcWald_SA’ but only change the up and lower bounds of each 
coefficient. The file can be provided on request.  
32 The state in an II estimation procedure can be considered as the set of structural parameters. 
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of a parameter gives a certain value as an ‘best estimate’ of the unknown population parameter 
which can be regarded as a sensible value. Theoretically, if the algorithm works perfectly, one 
can build condifence interval of the point estmate by calculating the correspounding standard 
error. The standard error of an point estimation  𝛽 is its standard deviation of the the sampling 
distrubtion of point estimators:  
𝜎𝛽 =
𝜎
√𝑁
                                                                 (4.7) 
where 𝜎 is population standard deviation. In doing this, we can estimate the model in many 
times and find similar sets of structual parameters and then calculate the standard deviation. 
However, in practice, this is not sensible. The problem arisen that one might find sets of 
structual parameters are virtually different. Most of them are contradictory to the economy 
theory of the model. Hence if one takes the average of these sets. it would not pass.  
The primary goal of carrying out II evaluation and estimation in this exercise is that one test 
the model unconditionally against the data and re-estimate to find a certain set of structural 
parameters to ensure it to fit as closely as possible. On the other hand, in contrast to classical 
‘frequentist’ FIML33, Bayesian ML and conventional interval estimations, as in discussed in 
Le et al (2012), both and indirect estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal in 
estimation, but the testing power of indirect inference in small samples is much stronger than 
that of direct inference, as found in Monte Carlo experiments. Therefore, it should also give 
more reliable results from estimation in small samples if we use the II procedure both to 
estimate the model on our available small samples and to test its specification. 
 
4.2.5 Why Non-stationary and how to handle   
 
Since the influential paper of Nelson and Plosser (1982), a large body of time series empirical 
works on unit roots and co-integration indicate that most of macroeconomics time series are 
non-stationary. In literature, it observes two types of non-stationary processes: (i) trend 
stationary where non-stationarity is deterministic, or in other words, processes are stationary 
around a trend; (ii) difference stationary where non-stationarity is stochastic that follows a unit 
roots process.  
                                                          
33 Refer as ‘Full information maximum likelihood’ 
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According to Wickens (1982), non-stationary data has two main implications for modelling. 
First, it enables us to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks. In the existence of 
stationary or trend stationary process, endogenous variables have short memories and shocks 
have temporary impact. Variables return to their steady trend after the shock. In the existence 
of a unit root process, the time series or endogenous variables have long memories and shocks 
have permanent effect. The variables do not return to their former path following a random 
disturbance. With permanent shock, endogenous variables sharing with the same BGP are 
transmitted by levels of permanent shock and the level of the variables then shift permanently. 
The former can be interpreted as the business cycle effect ‘cyclical component ‘and the latter 
is the long run growth path effect.   
Indeed, the most traditional practices are mapping the data to stationary by detrending time 
series data34, although the problem has been recognized in literatures. Researchers use linear 
(or higher order polynomial) detrending when assuming deterministic trends for model or first 
differencing data when assuming stochastic rends for model. However, transformations as 
input in the estimation process do not isolate fluctuations with the required periodicity (Canova, 
1998). The former approach is not proper when the data generating process includes stochastic 
trends, while the later approach tends to magnify the high frequency noise component in data. 
Eliminating or amplifying dynamics over certain frequency range can leaves potentially non-
negligible influence of permanent shocks in the stationary detrended data. 
Alternatively, researchers apply Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter or similar band pass (BP) filter to 
the data based on decomposition of economic time series into trend and cyclical components, 
see Baxter and King (1999) and King and Rebelo (1993). However, the use of the HP filter or 
BP filter also have been subject to heavy criticism. The main problems with HP filter are first 
the spurious effect it can produce to generate cycles may not exist when applied to detrending 
time series and second it markedly distorts key business cycle stylised facts between the 
cyclical components of the variables of interest because its two-sided moving average filter can 
alter the timing of the data information. For example, the HP filtering transforms the forward-
looking properties of the model, and seriously defects in the estimation of a DSGE model where 
both the expectations structure and the impulse response functions are usually matters of 
considerable interest (Meenagh et al 2012). It can also significantly bias the estimated dynamic 
parameters (Doorn,2006).  
                                                          
34 Gorodnichenko and Ng (2010) summarize a table to show how trends are treated in some notable papers.  
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Given ambiguity of the validity, a growing literature has criticised the nature of detrending data 
before DSGE model estimation. Andrle (2008) criticizes that the detrending data in DSGE 
model may be unable to explain co-movements of filtered time series because permanent 
shocks inducing dynamics usually have large influence on the business cycle and models using 
detrended data are less likely to capture the true business cycle dynamics. Canova (2014) 
compares several univariate filtering devices and finds that different approaches yield 
significantly different estimates of parameters. Approaches can potentially extract the cyclical 
component rely on assumptions about trend processes that can cause mismeasurement of 
cyclical components and bias the estimation of deep parameters. Other criticisms can also be 
found in Ferroni (2011); Canova and Ferroni (2011); Gorodnichenko and Ng (2010). 
The method applied in this chapter follows Meenagh et al (2012) that extend the work of Le et 
al (2011) to evaluation a model when ‘the data are nonstationary but not made stationary’. 
When the authors apply II mechanism on non-stationary data they reduce data to stationarity. 
This is done by assuming the endogenous variables are co-integrated with a set of exogenous 
non-stationary variables, so that the residuals are stationary. They assume the relationships can 
be written as a Vector Error Correction (VECM) model or Vector Auto Regression with 
Exogenous variable model (VARX) as the auxiliary model used to present the solution of log-
linearized model. 
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4.2.6 The choice of auxiliary model  
As discussed, the state-space representation of log-linearized DSGE model in general has a 
restricted VARMA representation for the endogenous variables.  It then can be approximately 
rewritten by a finite order reduced from VAR model. Hence, it follows that a VAR can be the 
natural auxiliary model to use for evaluating how closely a DSGE model fits the data whichever 
of the measures above are chosen for the comparison, and the data can be represented by an 
unrestricted VAR (Le et al 2016). The advantage of using auxiliary model over the others is 
that since the auxiliary model can be a mis-specified one and typically not even generative, but 
is easily fit to the data alone. As long as the model is identified with a restricted VAR, the 
structural restrictions of the DSGE model are then reflected in the data simulated from the 
model and will be consistent with the VAR, whereas the auxiliary model can be then estimated 
unrestrictedly both on those simulated data and on the original data.  
Following Meenagh et al (2012), a VECM specification can be used as an auxiliary model if 
the shocks or exogenous processes are non-stationary. Non-stationary exogenous processes 
will drive one or more structural equations have non-stationary residuals. Since these shock 
processes are backed from actual data and calibrated parameters, and if we treat these processes 
as observable variables then the number of cointegrating vectors will be less than the number 
of endogenous variables. This allows one to represent the solution of the estimated model as a 
VECM in which the nonstationary residuals appear as observable variables, and to use an 
unrestricted version of this VECM as the auxiliary model.  
As shown in Figure 4.2, the structural model presented in chapter 2 implies that the set of 
variables that we consider for our empirical analysis has several common trends or a balanced 
growth path. This suggests that we can obtain an approximation of the model if we generate a 
VECM.  
As in Meenagh et al. (2013) and Le et al. (2015), the VECM model is an approximation of the 
reduced form of DSGE model and can be represented as a cointegrated VARX model. We 
suppose that the structural model can be written in log linearized form as a function given by: 
𝐴(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵(𝐿)𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝐶(𝐿)𝑥𝑡 + 𝐷(𝐿)𝑒𝑡                                          (4.8) 
It assumes exogenous variables 𝑥𝑡 are non-stationary and follows a unit root process:  
∆𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎(𝐿)∆𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑑 + 𝑐(𝐿)𝜖𝑡                                                  (4.9) 
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where 𝑦𝑡 have a 𝑝𝑥1 vector of endogenous variables and 𝑥𝑡 have a 𝑞𝑥1 vector of exogenous 
variables.  𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 has a 𝑟×1 expected future endogenous variables.  𝑒𝑡 and  𝜖𝑡 are vectors of 
i.i.d error process with zero means and covariance matrix 𝛴. 𝐿 donotes the lag operator and 
𝐴(𝐿) (𝐵(𝐿) etc.) is a matrix polynomial functions in the lag operator of order  ℎ that have roots 
of the determinantal polynomial lies outside the complex unit circle. 𝑦𝑡 is also assumed to be 
non-stationary since it is linearly dependent on 𝑥𝑡. If 𝑦𝑡 and the variables are non-stationary 
and potentially co-integrated, the levels form of the VAR may not be the most useful 
representation since it does not contain the co-integration relations explicitly.  
The general solution of 𝑦𝑡 is given by: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺(𝐿)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐻(𝐿)𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓 + 𝑀(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁(𝐿)𝜖𝑡                              (4.10) 
where  𝑓 is a vector of constant and polynomial function in lag operator. Since yt and xt are 
both non-stationary, the solution has the 𝑝 cointegrating relationship that: 
𝑦𝑡 = [𝐼 − 𝐺(1)
−1[𝐻(1)𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓] = 𝛱𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔                                         (4.11) 
The 𝑝  × 𝑝  matrix 𝛱  has rank 0 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑝  , where 𝑟  is the number of linearly independent 
cointegrating vectors. Trends can be easily modelled within a DSGE model in various ways. 
There are two types of exogenous processes in the model: drifting and autoregressive processes. 
A generic exogenous variable X can be decomposed into two components: 
?̅?𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡
𝑑?̅?𝑡
𝑠                                                      (4.12) 
In long run, the solution is given by, 
?̅?𝑡 = 𝛱?̅?𝑡 + 𝑔                                                                        (4.13) 
?̅?𝑡 = [1 − 𝑎(1)]
−1[𝑑𝑡 + 𝑐(1)𝜉𝑡]                                                    (4.14) 
𝜉𝑡 = ∑ 𝜖𝑡−𝑠
𝑡−1
𝑠=0                                                                        (4.15) 
Where ?̅?𝑡 and  ?̅?𝑡 are the long run solution to 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 respectively. The solution of ?̅?𝑡 can be 
decomposed into a deterministic trend ?̅?𝑡
𝑑 = [1 − 𝑎(1)]−1𝑑𝑡  and a stochastic trend ?̅?𝑡
𝑠 =
[1 − 𝑎(1)]−1𝑐(1)𝜉𝑡.  
In that case, it may be advantageous to reparametrize the equation (4.12) by subtracting 𝑦𝑡−1 
on both sides to obtain:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑃(𝐿)∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑄(𝐿)∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓 + 𝑀(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁(𝐿)𝜖𝑡 − [𝐼 − 𝐺(1)](𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛱𝑥𝑡−1)    
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= 𝑃(𝐿)∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑄(𝐿)∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓 + 𝜔𝑡 − [𝐼 − 𝐺(1)](𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛱𝑥𝑡−1)                         (4.16) 
𝜔𝑡  = 𝑀(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁(𝐿)𝜖𝑡                                                             (4.17) 
where ωt is a mixed Moving Average process. The above VECM approximately consists of 
Vector Autoregression with exogenous variables (VARX) representation of the form: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = −𝐾(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛱𝑥𝑡−1) + 𝑅(𝐿)∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑆(𝐿)∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝜍𝑡              (4.18) 
where 𝜍𝑡 is i.i.d with zero mean.  
Since ?̅?𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡−1 + [1 − 𝑎(1)]
−1[𝑑 + 𝜖𝑡]  and ?̅?𝑡 = 𝛱?̅?𝑡 + 𝑔 
The form of the VARX can also be rewritten as: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝐾[(𝑦𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑡−1) − 𝛱(𝑥𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑡−1) + 𝑅(𝐿)∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑆(𝐿)∆𝑥𝑡 + ℎ + 𝜍𝑡       (4.19) 
where time trend the deterministic trend in ?̅?𝑡.  
𝑦𝑡 = [𝐼 − 𝐾]𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐾𝛱𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑛 + 𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡                                  (4.20) 
According to Le et al. (2015), either (4.18) or (4.19) can serve as the auxiliary model. 
Throughout this paper, I follow Le et al (2015), Minford (2015) to use equation (4.19) which 
distinguishes between the effect of the trend component and the temporary deviation of 𝑥𝑡 from 
trend. The advantage is that the estimation of the parameters of the VARX can be carried out 
by classical OLS methods. Meenagh et al. (2012) also proved that this procedure is extremely 
accurate using Monte Carlo experiments.   
 
4.2.7 The Property of Auxiliary Model   
 
The II test criterion is determined by the difference between empirical auxiliary Wald statistic 
from observed data and simulated auxiliary Wald statistic from simulated data as shown in 
equation (4.6). Those parameters (𝜃) of an auxiliary model can be not an accurate description 
of the data-generating process, but they can be estimated easily by conventional estimation 
methods. Therefore, there is no simple rule to identify the best auxiliary model, while 
asymptotically different models make no difference. As in Minford et al. (2016), there could 
be many choices for the auxiliary model or ‘data descriptors’ for the criterion function, as 
defined. Apart from VAR or VARX model, the impulse response function match that widely 
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used as a model evaluation method or for estimating the structural parameters of DSGE models 
(Schorfheide, 2002, Christiano et al., 2005), can also serve as a data descriptor. With VAR or 
VARX coefficients used as data descriptors, the estimated VAR/VARX parameters are to 
describe the dynamic property of the data, while the variance of the errors is to capture the data 
volatility.  With IRFs functions served as the data descriptions, the IRF function can be 
transferred as a nonlinear combination of VAR coefficients and the error covariance matrix35.  
Le et al. (2016) argues that since the most DSGE model are over-identified, hence with addition 
of more VAR (such as adding more variables in VAR or raising the order of the VAR), it would 
increase the power of test. However, increasing the power in means it would also reduce the 
chances of finding a tractable model that would pass the test, therefore there was a trade-off 
for users between power and tractability. According to emipircal results (le et al 2011, 2015, 
2016), when including a broader set of endogenous variables in auxiliary model, it usually 
results to a strong rejection. Le et al. (2015) pointed out that the power of the full Wald test 
increases as more endogenous variables is added and as the lag order is raised, leading to 
uniform rejections. Meenagh et al (2012) also argued it usually led to a rejection when a model 
appears to share with too many elaborate structures36.   
The auxiliary model used in this paper is a VARX(1) and is choose to describe main interest 
of three key macro variables data behaviour, and once one find that the structural model is 
rejected by a VARX(1), we do not proceed a more stringent test based on a higher order VARX.  
For example, if we start to look for Directed Wald statistics37 involving three subsets of all 
variables, Y, Q and R. For instance, a VARX (1) with three endogenous variabels can therefore 
reads: 
[
𝑦𝑡
𝑟𝑡
𝑞𝑡
] = 𝐵 [
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑟𝑡−1
𝑞𝑡−1
] + 𝐶 [
𝑇
𝑒𝑌𝑇
𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓
] + [
𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑡
]                                       (4.21) 
where 𝐵 = [
𝑏𝑦𝑦 𝑏𝑦𝑟 𝑏𝑦𝑞
𝑏𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑟𝑞
𝑏𝑞𝑦 𝑏𝑞𝑟 𝑏𝑞𝑞
]  
                                                          
35 Minford et al. (2016) show that the error et from a VAR model can be write as a: et = 𝐵𝑣𝑡, where 𝑣𝑡 is the structural 
innovations.  𝐵 denotes the error covariance matrix.  
36 They point out models such as SW and CEE have many nominal rigidities in the goods and labour markets and real rigidities 
such as habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, and variable capital utilization.  
37 Le et al. (2011) proposed directed Wald tests where the information used in evaluating a DSGE model was deliberately 
reduced to cover essential features of the data. The directed Wald is then focused a small subset of variables or aspects of their 
behaviour. 
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where t = 1,… , T denotes the time. Besides the lagged endogenous variables, the VARX (1) 
also incules lagged productivity trend (𝑒𝑌𝑇), time trend 𝑇 and the lagged level of net foreign 
assets (𝑏𝑡−1
𝑓
). 𝐶 captures the effect of exogenous variables that considered as the driving factors 
of non-stationarity. The parameter vector 𝜃  used for calculating the Wald statistics would 
contain all coefficients in B matrix and the variance of three fitted errors:  
𝜃 = [𝑏𝑦𝑦, 𝑏𝑦𝑟 , 𝑏𝑦𝑞 , 𝑏𝑟𝑦, 𝑏𝑟𝑟 , 𝑏𝑟𝑞, 𝑏𝑞𝑦, 𝑏𝑞𝑟, 𝑏𝑞𝑞, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑦𝑡), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑟𝑡), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑞𝑡)]′    (4.22) 
We check whether the model can replicate the behaviour of three endogenous variables jointly. 
In other words, the model will pass the test if it can match at least twelve parameters 38 
distribution jointly. Now if the number of chosen variable increases to four, it turns out we 
have to match at least twenty parameters in 𝜃. The testing power would therefore dramatically 
increase if one extra variable were included, and the model is usually severely rejected.   
4.3 Empirical Results 
 
4.3.1 Indirect Inference Test result based on Calibration 
 
In order to implement II estimation, calibration value of the parameters can be predefined as 
starting values. We follow the testing process discussed above with the hypothesis that the 
calibrated model replicates the actual data. Table 4.1 reports the Wald statistic and normalised 
Transformed Mahalanobis Distance (TMD) of the II test results.  It should be noted that in this 
study, instead of using the asymptotic distribution of the Wald statistic, we follow use an 
empirical estimate of its small sample distribution obtained by bootstrap explained in Section 
4.2. It indicates that estimated Wald statistics do not follow a Chi squared distribution, in other 
word, a Wald statistic reported less than 90 does not necessarily mean to pass the test.  We then 
use the TMD t statistic as reference for assessment.  
Not surprisingly, it is turns out hypothesises are severely rejected. For example, the TMD 
statistic for variables subset are 3.68 (for Y, π, R), 3.21 (for Y, Q, R), and 4.32 (for Y, EFP, R) 
respectively. This indicates by using calibrated parameters, the model with or without financial 
frictions cannot explain the data behaviour. It is obviously that we attempt to evaluate the model 
based on unreasonable values for some parameters. For selected variables subsets, Table 4.2 
also tells whether each estimated coefficients of auxiliary model based on the actual date lies 
                                                          
38 In this case, the vector 𝜃 does not include the parameter matrix C. It turns out to be 21 parameters if C included.  
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between the 95% the up and lower bound of coefficients from simulation. In most cases, four 
out of twelve are falling out of the bound.  However, the TMD here is used as the guidance not 
only to tell how bad the model performs to fits the data but also to access how far the model 
deviates away from non-rejection. The estimation process is then to search for a vector of 
structural coefficients within chosen bounds39  that minimises the Wald statistic given the 
chosen auxiliary model.  
  
                                                          
39 The whole process is conducted as follows: we first simulate 1000 vector of parameters within 30% bound by using SA in 
MATLAB, and then aggrade these vectors in a large vector by sequences. FORTRAN reads these vectors in order and repeat 
the testing process until it find the minimized Wald statics and corresponding TMD.  
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Table 4.1 Wald test results based on Calibration 
VARX(1) Subsets SW SWBGG 
1 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅 31.23 
(2.31) 
49.64 
(3.68) 
2 𝑌, 𝑅, 𝐸𝐹𝑃 - 53.39 
(4.08) 
3 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝐸𝐹𝑃 - 78.29 
(5.98) 
4 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝑅 32.70 
(2.51) 
38.33 
(3.21) 
5 𝑁𝑊,𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑅 - 44.74 
(4.32) 
6 𝑌, 𝐸𝐹𝑃,𝑁𝑊 - 29.31 
(2.20) 
7 𝑅, 𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑄 - 96.42 
(7.42) 
†TMD t statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Table 4.2  VARX parameters and Bootstrap Bounds for output, inflation and interest rate (SWBGG 
based on calibration) 
𝑌 𝜋 𝑅 Estimated  95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound IN/OUT 
𝑏𝑦𝑦 0.988 0.587 0.968 OUT 
𝑏𝑦𝜋 -0.248 -0.067 0.074 OUT 
𝑏𝑦𝑟 -0.519 -0.680 0.200 IN 
𝑏𝜋𝑦  -0.005 -0.117 0.116 IN 
𝑏𝜋𝜋 0.935 0.963 1.006 OUT 
𝑏𝜋𝑟  0.074 -0.308 0.301 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝑦 0.007 -0.068 0.063 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝜋 0.0127 -0.027 0.028 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝑟 0.900 0.624 0.976 IN 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑦) 5.629×10
−5 4.294×10−4 0.004 OUT 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝜋) 5.758×10
−6 3.695×10−4 4.289×10−4 OUT 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑟) 4.894×10
−6 7.015×10−5  7.843×10−4 OUT 
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4.3.2 Indirect inference Estimation Results  
Following the method discussed above, we then apply the II estimate on two models to 
empirically assess the difference across the two models and evaluate the contribution of 
financial frictions. Table 4.3 provides the results of II estimates for two models, column 4 
reports the SWBGG model results, column 5 contains the SW model results and column 3 
states calibrated parameters for comparison. It should be noted that the discount factor  𝛽 , 
depreciation rate 𝛿 and entrepreneurs’ survival rate 𝜃 are set to be fixed.  
We first compare the II estimates of the parameters for SWBGG model with the calibration. 
For nominal rigidities parameters, the Calvo parameter for price 𝜉𝑝 is estimated to be 0.7108, 
slightly lower than the starting value. Wage inflation follows a similar path to price inflation. 
The Calvo parameter for wage 𝜉𝑤 increases to 0.8186 from 0.70. Degree of price indexation 𝜄𝑝 
decreases to 0.1969, still lower than the Degree of wage indexation 𝜄𝑤 that estimated to be 
0.4817. This indicates that wage inflation is more persistent than price inflation. The proportion 
of sticky wages that encodes the weight of Ney Keynesian price is estimated to 0.3764 while 
the proportion of sticky price is equal to 0.1082. Both of parameters are readily increased.  The 
Share of capital in production adjusts to 0.2404 after the estimation, which decreases by nearly 
30%. For real rigidities parameters, the parameter ℎ  that encodes external habits in 
consumption decreases to 0.5763. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 𝜎𝑐 decreases to 
1.2985. The parameter governing the elasticity of steady state investment adjustment (𝜑) drops 
to 5.6431, while the parameter governing the degree of capital utilisation increases from 0.54 
to 0.6315. Overall, monetary policy is estimated to be more responsive to inflation and 
correspondingly less responsive to real output fluctuations and less auto-correlated. The 
responsiveness of interest rates to inflation 𝑟𝑝 increases from 2.50 to 2.6764. In contrast, the 
policymaker's reaction coefficient to output 𝑟𝑦 and output change 𝑟𝛥𝑦decrease to 0.0642 and 
0.2070 respectively compared with the calibrated value. Moreover, interest rate smoothing 
parameter 𝜌 also reduces to 0.5646.  
Turning to the second comparison in column 4 (estimates of SWBGG model) and column 
5(estimates of SW model), the results reveal the degree of Calvo price and Calvo wage 
stickiness are higher in SW model, both with a higher proportion with the hybrid setting.  It is 
striking that the steady state elasticity of investment adjust cost in SW model (6.8227) is 
significantly higher than in SWBGG model (5.6431). On the other hand, one plus the share of 
fixed cost in production also increased to 1.9422 in SW model, compared to that of in SWBGG 
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model is 1.7541. It seems that the parameter relating to the degree of real frictions is higher in 
SW model due to the absence of financial friction. Elasticity of capital utilization in SW model 
falls to 0.4431 revealing that the capital utilisation is costlier in SWBGG model (0.6315). The 
Taylor rule response to inflation is lower in the SWBGG model, while the other policy 
coefficients are higher.  
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Table 4.3 Structural parameter estimates 
Parameters Description Calibration  II estimation 
 SW+BGG SW 
Fixed 
𝛽 Discount rate 0.998 0.998 0.998 
𝛿 Capital depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 0.025 
𝜃 Survival rate of entrepreneurs 0.99 0.99 - 
Households 
𝜎𝑐 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.39 1.2985 1.1244 
ℎ degree of External habit formation 0.70 0.5763 0.6619 
𝜎𝐿 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1.83 3.1109 3.5863 
𝜉𝑤 degree of wage stickiness 0.70 0.8186 0.8095 
𝜄𝑤 Degree of wage indexation  0.58 0.4817 0.6839 
𝜔𝑤 Proportion of sticky wages 0.40 0.3764 0.4724 
Producers 
𝜉𝑝 Degree of price stickiness 0.75 0.7108 0.7423 
𝜄𝑝 Degree of price indexation 0.24 0.1969 0.2287 
𝜓 Elasticity of capital utilization 0.54 0.6315 0.4431 
𝛷 1+Share of fixed costs in production  1.50 1.7541 1.9422 
𝜑 Steady state elasticity of investment 
adjustment cost 
5.74 5.6431 6.8227 
𝛼 Share of capital in production 0.33 0.2759 0.3906 
𝜔𝑟 Proportion of sticky prices 0.10 0.1082 0.1194 
Taylor rule 
𝑟𝑝 Response to inflation 2.50 2.6764 2.1628 
𝜌 Interest rate smoothing 0.60 0.5646 0.7078 
𝑟𝑦  Response to output 0.08 0.0642 0.0716 
𝑟𝛥𝑦 Response to output change 0.22 0.2070 0.2415 
Financial frictions 
𝜒 Elasticity of the premium with respect to 
leverage 
0.04 0.0477 - 
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4.3.3 Shock process   
 
For each calculated shock process, it conducts two different types of stationarity test: The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test 
so as to test both the null hypothesis of a unit root and that of stationarity. The results are 
reported in Table 4.4.  It shows that under both the ADF and KPSS test, the null hypothesis of 
a unit root cannot be rejected at 5% level for productivity shock. It rules out the specification 
in which productivity shock is deterministic trend stationary and concludes that the 
productivity shock appears to be integrated process of order one I (1), which contains a 
stochastic trend.  
On the other hand, for labour supply shock, net worth shock and exogenous foreign 
consumption, although the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at conventional 5% 
level by the ADF test, the KPSS statistics suggest it cannot reject the null of stationarity at 10% 
level. Here, I assume these exogenous processes are stationary or trend stationary in line with 
the setup in Le et al (2011) and Le et al (2012). For the rest of the shock processes, the P-value 
from ADF test and KPSS statistic suggest relatively strong rejections of the unit-root. The 
results provide solid evidence for the existence of stationarity. Although some empirical works 
suggest different specification of the law of motion for the exogenous shocks can somewhat 
help to fit the model40, however in this paper, other than the productivity shock, the other 
exogenous shocks are assumed to exhibit AR (1) dynamics or AR (1) dynamics with a 
deterministic trend. Clearly, AR (1) persistent values suggest that differences among these 
shocks are sizable. As discussed above, an important implication of the deterministic 
components of the stochastic processes is that they generate the balanced growth path (BGP) 
of the model. In practice, after simulating the model from original data in the base run, it 
computes the differences between the simulation data and original data to get the effects of 
these shocks, either stationary or non-stationary. It then adds in the BGP on the effects of the 
shocks, whereas in the version of the model, deterministic components and then BGP are fixed.  
  
                                                          
40 Smets and Wouters (2007) use an ARMA mark-up shock to improve model fit. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009) let their 
government spending shock follow a higher-order autoregressive process. 
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Table 4.4 Testing the Null Hypothesis of Non-stationarity 
Shock Process Constant Trend AR(1) KSPP Statistic ADF P 
value 
Government 
Spending 
Trend 
Stationary 
3.102** 0.0008** 0.571** 0.059+++ 0.009 
Preference Stationary -0.0003  -0.091 0.210+++ 0.000 
Investment Stationary 0.333**  0.327** 0.364+++ 0.015 
Taylor rule Stationary -0.411  0.387 0.439++ 0.014 
Productivity Non Stationary 0.002**  ¤0.094** 1.531 1.000 
Price mark-up Stationary 0.0005  0.076* 0.254+++ 0.000 
Wage mark-up Stationary -0.270**  0.078 0.150+++ 0.000 
Labour hours Stationary -25.079**  0.915** 0.257+++ 0.172 
External 
premium 
Stationary -0.088**  0.621** 0.387++ 0.090 
Net worth Stationary 0.039**  0.622* 0.525+ 0.059 
Export Trend 
Stationary 
-4.837** 0.0028** 0.862** 0.183+ 0.044 
Import Trend  
Stationary 
-1.885** 0.0046** 0.833** 0.158+ 0.020 
Foreign 
Consumption 
Trend 
Stationary 
14.505** 0.0128** 0.984** 0.246+ 0.155 
Foreign Interest 
rate 
Stationary 0.024**  0.915** 0.154++ 0.097 
† **Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 10% level 
†† For KSPP Statistic: +++ Significant at the 1% level; ++significant at the 5% level; +significant at the 10% level; 
†††  Productivity shock follows a ARIMA(1,1,0) process.   
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Figure 4.2 Residual calculated from log linearized behaviour model using estimated parameter 
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4.3.4 Indirect Inference Test Result Based on Estimation 
 
The structural parameters are re-estimated by Indirect Inference, and then the minimised Wald 
and corresponding TMD t statistics for different chosen variable subsets are shown in Table 
4.5.  For SWBGG model, the auxiliary model with output, inflation and interest is significantly 
not rejected with a Wald percentile of 21.17 and t statistics of 1.01. Individual VARX (1) 
coefficients of the model are generally within the 95% bounds generated from simulation. 
Although the variance of output error and the variance of interest rate error are outside the 
bound. By assessing the coefficients distribution plotting, Figure 4.14 illustrates that these 
variances just have little derivation from the lower bound, and then it does not affect the model 
parameters jointly to pass the Wald.  Moreover, with other different subset of variances, the 
auxiliary VECM model also comfortably jointly pass the Wald and TMD t statistics. It should 
be noted that for subset interest rate, EFP and real exchange rate, the t statistic of 1.88 is slight 
over the 1.64 pass criteria, which indicates a rejection of the model. However, considering on 
the one hand, it poses extras challenge for adding a financial friction and an open economy 
setting; on the other hand, the result is not rejected by 10% critical level. The overall 
performance of modelling fitting by estimated structural parameters is fairly acceptable 
(Distribution of individual VARX (1) coefficients are plotted in Figure 4.14.   
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Table 4.5 Direct Wald Test Results Based on II estimation 
 Subsets SW SWBGG 
1 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅 20.24 
(1.19) 
21.17 
(1.01) 
2 𝑌, 𝑅, 𝐸𝐹𝑃 - 19.02 
(0.68) 
3 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝐸𝐹𝑃 - 24.08 
(1.49) 
4 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝑅 17.71 
(0.91) 
29.73 
(1.55) 
5 𝑁𝑊,𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑄 - 28.96 
(1.73) 
6 𝑌, 𝐸𝐹𝑃,𝑁𝑊 - 13.41 
(0.23) 
7 𝑅, 𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑄 - 29.75 
(1.88) 
†TMD t statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Table 4.6 VECM parameters and Bootstrap Bounds for output, inflation and interest rate (SWBGG) 
𝑌 𝜋 𝑅 Estimated  95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound IN/OUT 
𝑏𝑦𝑦 0.9970 0.5472 1.0649 IN 
𝑏𝑦𝜋 -0.1330 -1.0480 1.0707 IN 
𝑏𝑦𝑟 -0.3281 -0.9472 0.4837 IN 
𝑏𝜋𝑦  0.0138 -0.0138 0.1216 IN 
𝑏𝜋𝜋 0.2560 -0.0111 0.3984 IN 
𝑏𝜋𝑟  0.0749 0.0055 0.2623 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝑦 0.0068 -0.0838               0.1266 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝜋 0.0272 -0.3890 0.2850 IN 
𝑏𝑟𝑟 0.8863 0.5984 0.9990 IN 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑦) 0.0000556 0.000175 0.0073 OUT 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝜋) 0.0007228 4.26×10
−5 0.0012 IN 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑟) 4.80×10
−6 5.66×10−5 0.0006 OUT 
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4.4 Empirical analysis   
 
In this section, I first contrast overall dynamic with those of the SWBGG model and the SW 
model with financial friction shutting off41. The impulse responses of macroeconomic and 
financial variables to a 10 percent rise in a variety of structural shocks are plotted in Figure 4.3 
through Figure 4.8 of Appendix 4.A. 10 percent rise in a variable is denoted as 0.1 on the y-
axis and the number of quarters elapsed since the shock begins are indicated on the x-axis. The 
solid line presents the full SWBGG model and the dash-circle line presents the SW model when 
external finance premium switched off. Overall, the quantitative dynamics regarding the 
macroeconomic variables are mostly similar across the two models. However, qualitative 
differences emerge through the modification with respect to net worth and the finance premium. 
It also should be noted since the parameter estimates differ between the two models reported 
in table 4.3, the comparisons among the IRFs is qualitative rather than quantitative. 
We also use variance and historical decomposition of the observable variables in order to 
understand the role of each shock as drivers of endogenous variables to quantify the role of 
different shocks. In particular, we analyse the importance of financial shocks, before and during 
the financial crisis period. The variance decomposition is computed based on 2006Q1-2014Q4 
that focuses on the financial crisis and post-crisis period. The historical decomposition is built 
using the II estimated coefficients and corresponding parameters of shock processes over the 
sample 1975Q1-2014Q4.  
For variance decomposition, we proceed a similar way as in historical decomposition but 
bootstrap each actual structural shock. After obtaining the difference between the actual and 
simulated data for each endogenous variable, we calculate its corresponding variance. The 
variance then measures the contribution of each type of shock to the overall forecast error 
variance, while the overall forecast error variance is the sum of variance computed from each 
structural shocks’ simulation.  It is noted that with bootstrapped actual shocks, is not surprising 
that the variance decomposition is rather different from other empirical studies (maybe 
obtained from DYNARE). Because in this exercise, we use the actual errors and re-estimated 
auto-regression parameters from observed data42.  
                                                          
41 The open economy set up are included in both models. 
42 See Meenagh et al (2008) for detailed discussion 
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For historical decomposition, given the starting values of all the endogenous variables, we run 
a simulation in which one historical shock affect the economy while the other shocks are set 
equal to zero in all periods. This simulation shows us a proportion of movements in each 
endogenous variable caused by the chosen shock. The simulated model variables at each point 
in time can be represented as a function of initial values plus each structural shock of the model. 
The difference between the actual and simulated data can then be attributed to shock originating 
from the endogenous variables. We can repeat this exercise for the rest of the shocks in order 
to apportion all movements in the endogenous variables between them all. Therefore, the sum 
of each shocks to each variable then would be treated as the overall effect. By using bar plot, 
one can easily compare the relative contribution of individual shocks to each variable. 
 
4.4.1 Impulse response function  
Productivity shock 
I first consider the impacts of a non-stationary positive productivity shock. As can be seen from 
figure 4.3, the whole structure of the interest rates coherently decreases through the horizon. 
Due to a positive persistent parameter in ARIMA (1,1,0) in the de-trended shock process (i.e. 
a non-stationary process), macroeconomic variables including output, consumption, 
investment and the stock of physical capital react positively to the realization of productivity 
progress and this permanent effect becomes more persistent afterwards lasting over 30 quarters. 
Inflation falls as a result of increasing in the supply of goods because products are produced 
with a superior technology as well as the decreasing in marginal cost while monetary policy 
does not response enough to offset the negative impact. The demand for physical capital is 
stimulated and, as a consequence, its price (Tobin’s Q) increases, which in turn pushes up 
entrepreneurs’ net worth. A negative effect on financial premium then is expected to be 
accompanied by a positive effect on entrepreneurial net worth, which helps to further increases 
investment. Labour hour is negatively affected due to higher productivity and the presences of 
nominal price rigidities43, consumption habit formation, and adjustment cost owing to SW07. 
To foreign variables, because output is higher, it must be sold on world markets by lowering 
its price. This would then lead to devaluation of the real exchange rate (a rise in Q) as shown 
                                                          
43 This is because when the output supplied increases, because prices adjust slowly, aggregate demand does not immediately 
match this increase so employment fall. 
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in the figure. Moreover, real exchange rate devaluation which improves domestic goods’ 
competitiveness also leads to an increasing export and a decreasing import results to an 
increasing in net exports, which consequently leads to an accumulated net foreign asset. The 
responses to a productivity shock present the empirical evidences are in line with those 
observed in Le et al. (2012). In SW model, a productivity shock causes an ‘overshooting’ of 
investment and output in response to SWBGG. This results contrast with BGG but in line with 
Christensen and Dib (2008) and De Graeve (2008), in which favourable productivity shock 
smooths the reaction of investment and output to a model with financial frictions. 
Monetary policy shock 
Figure 4.4 depicts the IRFs of the baseline SWBGG model and the alternative simple SW 
model to a 10% monetary policy shock which increase nominal interest rate. The standard 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission suggests such monetary contraction 
discourage the investment and consumption, and therefore reduces output. It is striking that the 
bottom effect on consumption occurring in the second quarter reflecting the impact of habit 
formation on the dynamics of consumption. Demand downward shift then pressures feed 
through changes in output gap to inflation, which also lower the marginal cost and inflation. 
Aggregate demand falls together with the falls on demand for all inputs, which also lower 
labour demand that bring down the real wage. The deflation also causes higher entrepreneur’s 
borrowing rate of capital and lower the real return to investment. The fall in real capital price 
and investment demand are due to high expected financing cost in the future, which reduces 
the net worth as a consequence and the external premium turns out to be counter-cyclical.  
Higher nominal and real interest rate appreciates the British pound that reduces real exchange 
rate. This helps to increase imports as domestic currency becomes less attractive, while exports 
fall with real exchange rates. However, from T=2 onwards, nominal interest rate starts to 
increase and the continuing dropping in consumption sufficiently reduce the values of imports. 
Since exports start to converge back, imports reach the bottom at T=3, and start to converge 
back from T=4.  With exports falls and converge back, imports fall further, along with 
aggregate demand, trade balance goes into surplus, therefore net foreign bond start to 
accumulate for 15 quarters.    
When comparing two models, the accelerating mechanism of the external finance premium is 
clearly represented demonstrated in the response of a marginal dampening investment in 
SWBGG model relative to the base SW model. The logic behind the amplification effect is that 
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in SWBGG framework, unexpected increase in nominal interest rate lifts the cost of raising 
capital and reduces capital price which leads to a decrease of the net worth which makes the 
entrepreneur riskier. The financial intermediaries translate into higher premium and it further 
depresses investments, generating the extra response displayed in the figure. This confirms the 
theoretical prescription and empirical finding in most of literatures. (Christensen and Dib 
(2008), CMM (2010) that suggest stronger amplification of monetary policy shock in the real 
economy when the financial friction has been considered.)  
External premium shock 
In Figure 4.5, the responses from a 10% standard deviation increase in the external finance 
premium shock are depicted. As in SWBGG model, the increase in the cost of capital funding 
borrowing drives Tobin’s Q down immediately, which leads to a further drop in initial 
declining in investment. On the other hand, the decrease in net worth further exacerbates the 
balance sheet effect. The implication of balance sheet effect is that lower net worth decreases 
entrepreneurs' stake in financing capital expenditures and so pushes them to borrow at a higher 
premium over the risk-free rate. Investment then falls further due to the effects of the external 
finance premium friction.  
The nominal interest rate slightly increases on impact at first period however the impact is 
short-lived. The monetary policy rapidly drops starting from T=2.  The interest rate differential 
relative to abroad is rapidly widen through URIP channel, leads to a rise of Q. Therefore, a 
positive premium shock immediately depreciates the real exchange rate which makes export 
become more competitiveness. The export then increases with import reduces. The net foreign 
assets position increases overall. The variables in SW model have no response because the 
financial frictions are switched off.  
Investment specific shock  
I then analyse the response of a 10% investment specific shock depicted in figure 4.6 and the 
responses of variables are similar for both models as expected. In response to a positive shock, 
the price of capital decreases which leads to a rise in investment and hence output and labour 
hours in both models. In SW model, investment, output and labour hours increase before 
returning gradually to their steady states. In SWBGG model, the response of real variables to 
this shock are smaller than those from the SW model. According to Christensen and Dib (2008), 
this is due to the cost of buying new capital falls. This then decreases the return on capital and 
the net worth, as shown in the figure. Therefore, it consequently increase the external finance 
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premium and then in turn raise the cost of purchasing capital to fund the investment. Therefore, 
the investment would decrease further to the steady state value, and so as the output. It confirms 
the results described in De Graeve (2008) and Christensen and Dib (2008) but sharply contrast 
to the conclusion from BGG.44 The response of investment is attenuated in SWBGG model 
where it enjoys a nearly 0.2 margin when investment hit the bottom. Such response to 
investment shock may also be coming from the presence of investment adjustment cost 
according to De Graeve (2008) 45 . Under the presence of investment adjustment, when 
investment rises, in order to minimize costs associated with changing their investment flow, 
investment will be positive for a protracted period of time. This brings up the premium because 
entrepreneurs’ borrowing needs also increase due to high investments. The implications of 
including finance premium for interest rate, inflation and output are found to be relatively 
minor comparing to investment and capital. It induces an increasing in nominal interest rate 
and CPI inflation then consumption decreases. Real exchange rate decreases leading to a 
decline of export and increase of import. This causes a trade balance deficit so as to decrease 
the net foreign assets position in medium term. The net foreign assets position also contributes 
to a smaller response under SWBGG.  
Export demand shock  
Figure 4.7 depicts the responses from a 10% standard deviation increase of an export demand 
shock that increase export demand on impact. In this experiment, the effect from an export 
demand shock comes with two folds. First, it acts as an aggregate demand shock through the 
expenditure switching effect. It then stimulates output, inflation and nominal interest rates but 
crowds out investment. It also crowds out consumption, since the AR (1) parameter of shock 
is persistent enough. Second, the effect is through the real uncovered interest rate parity. Due 
to the excess demand, real exchange rate is required to appreciate to dampen exports and thus 
return the economy back to steady state. In response to the currency depreciation and the 
decrease in the inverse of real exchange rate Q (increase in the exchange rate), the central bank 
then raises the nominal interest rate to compensate for the compensate for the currency 
depreciation. Import has a consequence increase since Q decreases, however the magnitude of 
increase is small related to export. It will eventually result in an improvement in net foreign 
                                                          
44 In BGG, investment shocks reduce the premium and therefore boost investment relative to a model without financial frictions. 
This implies a investment shock should lead to a counter-cyclical external finance premium 
45 De Graeve (2008) explains that in BGG’s study it assumes a capital adjustment cost, while in Christensen and Dib (2008) 
and De Graeve’s model following SW03 setup, it includes with investment adjustment cost which implies a more gradual 
response of investment.  
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assets position. The presence of the external finance premium of SWBGG model amplifies the 
decline in capital price and investment, due to its negative impact on the net worth, but the 
responses of output, consumption, export and import are almost identical in the models with 
and without external finance premium.  
Wage mark-up shock 
Figure 4.8 plots the responses of variables to a positive 10% standard deviation wage mark-up 
shock. The wage mark-up shock leads to an increase in the cost of production, it then exerts a 
contractionary effect on output. Although a rise in inflation accompanied by a rise in nominal 
interest rate, increase in inflation is higher than that in nominal interest rate. This leads to a 
decrease in real interest rate than in turn causes an increase in external finance premium and a 
decrease in net worth. This effect acts in the direction of attenuating the impact of the wage 
mark-up shock. The responses of foreign sector variables are similar to that to a positive 
monetary shock. Since both nominal and real interest rate increases, it then appreciates 
domestic current and real exchange rate declines. It then follows a fall in exports and a rise in 
imports.  
 
4.4.2 Variance decomposition 
 
Table 4.9 and 4.10 report the variance decompositions of model shocks without and with the 
presence of the financial friction respectively for output, inflation, nominal interest rate, 
consumption and real exchange rate the based on the model estimation. First of all, output 
variance decomposition is heavily influenced by the supply shocks, in which productivity 
shock contributes 29.8% and labour supply shock contributes 23.4%, in the SW model. The 
contribution of investment shock is also strong with a 20.4% contribution. Government 
spending, preference, monetary policy and price mark-up shocks are all have a small but 
significant contribution to the output variance at the business cycle frequency. Wage mark-up 
shock is too weak to explain a significant proportion of the output fluctuation. The export and 
import demand shocks originating in the open economy setting do have a significant impact, 
counting as 6.4% and 5.0% respectively.  
In the SWBGG model when financial shocks are introduced, EFP shock together net worth 
shock explain a sizable fraction for explaining output movement. These shocks owing to 
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financial friction account for around 22%.  The contributions from other shocks expect for the 
investment shock are quite similar with those in the SW model. Productivity (27.7%) and 
labour supply (26.6%) are still the main driving forces of output fluctuations. However, the 
contribution from investment shock sharply decreases to 3.1%.  According to the results, the 
impact of investment shock has transmitted to the financial disturbances.  
The result found here is at odd with De Graeve (2008), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) 
who reported the financial risk shock is the dominants. However, it is also somewhat different 
from the empirical finding from Meier and Miller (2006), Gelain (2010) arguing that financial 
shocks are not the main driver. Le et al (2012) that argues that financial shocks only account 
for 9% of the output variance, although the study is based on U.S data.  With similar model 
structural, my finding suggests financial disturbances give a 22% contribution of UK output 
variation which serve as the third largest impact.  Furthermore, although investment-specific 
shock plays the third largest role in SW model, although it is also not a dominants driver 
account for other variable fluctuations. This is somewhat in line with Justiniano and Preston 
(2010) that argued the investment shocks act as the main driver of fluctuations.  
The variance decomposition of exchange rate is different for both models. Foreign disturbances 
(export and import demand shock) make the most contribution (40% in SW model and 35% in 
SWBGG model) of explaining the real exchange fluctuation. Productivity and labour supply 
shock are also the key driver that contribute around 20% in both models. However, in SW 
model, government spending, preferences, monetary policy shocks are play a relevant role, 
while impact from these shocks is reduced in SWBGG model. With the introductory of 
financial disturbances, EFP shocks make a 13% contribution and net worth contributes a 4.1%, 
which is quite significant. Other studies, as in de Walque, et al (2005), the UIP shock explains 
around 60% to 70% of the exchange rate variance. However, since the UIP shock is assumed 
to be constant backing to equation (3. 13), such empirical results are not suitable for comparing.  
Turning to nominal variables, the variance decomposition of inflation is quite similar for both 
models. Productivity and price mark-up shock are indicated by far the two-major source for 
explaining in inflation. Foreign shocks make up 5 to 6 % of the variance. In SWBGG model, 
financial shocks only explain less than 2% of inflation. Other than that, labour supply shocks 
compete with monetary policy shocks, technology shocks, and preference shocks to explain 
the bulk of movements in inflation. 
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However, financial shocks (especially EFP shock) play a virtual role for variability of interest 
rate. They situate with a significant impact of 20% in SWBGG model, although monetary 
policy plays in a dominate role. The impact of productivity and labour supply shock are also 
strong as they have a contribute of around at least 15% in both models. The impact of price 
mark-up is situated at 5.1% in SWBGG model, while the contribution doubled when the 
financial friction switched off.   
Last but not the least, EFP, net worth and investment shock are the main source of external 
finance premium variability. The rest of the fluctuations that explained by labour supply shock 
and monetary policy shock are limited, while productivity shock contributes the impact of 7%. 
All in all, the impact of wage mark-up shock is virtually not trivial.  
 
4.4.3 Historical decomposition 
 
In discussing the historical decomposition, it concentrated on three variables: output, interest 
rate and inflation. Figure 4.9 to 4.12 depicts the historical decomposition for selected variables. 
The historical decomposition of the shocks to output is shown in Figure 4.9, as shown, in the 
recession of the early 1990s productivity shocks ((in turquoise), labour supply shocks (in brown) 
are the most significant component of negative shocks to output, and interest rate (in yellow) 
shock plays a negative role in explaining the output; while the external finance premium (EFP) 
shock (in dark grey) makes a positive contribution to output. This implies this recession period 
is not due to any shocks in financial market, but the traditional ‘macro’ shocks, such as 
productivity and labour supply shocks. Moreover, investment specific shocks (in light grey) 
also make a positive contribution during the early 1990s recession and almost a positive 
contribution over 1998 to 2007.  
During the financial crisis period after 2008, productivity shock contributes negatively to 
output in the crisis period until 2013Q2. It then makes a positive contribution in recovery the 
economy. Labour supply shocks however contribute positively to output before the crisis, but 
their contribution turns negative after the 2008, then return positive from 2013 onwards to the 
end of the period. It is noted during recession of the early 1990s, the recovery period of late 
1990s to 2000, EFP shock make a material positive contribution, before it plays a dampening 
role during the financial crisis. The EFP shock accounts for a significant portion of drop in 
output from 2008Q2, and continues the negative effects on output onwards. Entrepreneurial 
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new worth shock (in sandy brown) also contributes negatively to output, whereas their 
contribution is limited. The investment shock turns to have a significant negative impact from 
2008 to 2015, including the recovery time from 2014. The negative contribution from 
investment shock is intuitive since the negative impact from EPF shock drive investment then 
falls further due to the effects of the external finance premium friction. Compared with the 
previous recession, interest rate shock partially offsetting the downturn with its positive 
contribution due to a slashing and continuing interest rate cuts. Government spending shock 
(in dark blue) makes virtually little contribution to not only the downturn both for early 1990s 
recession and the financial crisis period, but also the whole cyclical fluctuations. Turning to 
open economy shocks, the effects from export demand and import demand (in dark green) 
shocks usually offset each other for most of the period.  
By comparing the two periods of recession discussed above, the main dominant effect is still 
coming from the non-financial shocks. With the introduction of financial shocks, they have 
material negative contributions in the recent cession, however they do contribution positively 
in the early 1990s recession. It is striking that the investment shock has an almost identical 
impact on output as the EPF shock has. Therefore, it seems that financial shocks, especially 
EFP shock partially involves to relegated the role of investment specific shock.  
Figure 4.11 explains the contribution of the shocks to the nominal interest movement. The 
monetary policy rule shock was clearly but not surprisingly, had a major impact on interest rate 
over the horizon, in particular, before 2000. EPF shock also give a important role for explaining 
the movement. In the recent crisis, it together with monetary policy shock, had a negative 
contribution. Such negative impact then partially offset by labour supply shock and price mark-
up shock. Besides that, government spending shock was also contributing to movement of 
interest rate and the impacts are negative over the periods. Figure 4.12 shows the price mark-
up and productivity shock has the largest effect on the movement of inflation. The productivity 
shock in the sense has a negative effect on output and a positive effect on inflation. Price mark-
up shocks come to the second largest shock in the sense that usually have a positive effect on 
the movement of inflation. Monetary policy also contributes a positive effect on the movement 
of inflation during and after the crisis time. Not surprisingly, the three shocks were situated for 
explaining movement. Besides, labour supply and EPF shocks also have sizeable effects.   
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4.4.4 Robustness Check 
In this section, we present a suite of robustness checks to evaluate alternative sample periods 
and the strength of misspecification of debt contract. 
 Post 1992 sample re-evaluation  
 
Our baseline estimation period spans from 1975Q1 through to 2015Q4 includes different 
monetary regimes. First, monetary targeting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, second, the 
sterling’s exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and third the adoption of inflation 
targeting in October 1992 as the objective of monetary policy. To check for the robustness of 
the results, we consider re-evaluating the model with the post-1992Q3 sample by using the 
estimated structural parameter. I then investigate whether previous estimates results are 
sensitive to the chosen sample. In particular, I am interested to assess whether model can still 
fit the set of nominal interest rate with other variables. The test is based on the subset of output, 
inflation, real exchange rate and EPF shown in Table 4.7.  
For subset 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅, although the TMD t statistics (reported 1.34) is larger than that of in full 
sample (1.01), it is lower than 1.645 and still inside the 95% non-rejection critical level. For 
subset 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝑅, the t statistics is reported as 1.94 implying that this model cannot replicate the 
dynamic properties of a combination of output, inverse of real exchange rate and nominal 
interest rate in VARX (1) estimates. However, such result is close to a non-rejection level. 
Furthermore, for 𝑌, 𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑅, the model is nevertheless significantly rejected.  
The above results imply that, the estimated coefficients can be used to capture some key 
dynamic features of the non-financial data. In particular, model performances of output, 
inflation and nominal interest are not sensitive to the changing of monetary regimes or at least 
the monetary regime after 1992Q3. However, when considering a combination of finance and 
non-finance variables, such as EFP with output and interest rate, one has to re-estimate the 
model to fit the data better.   
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Table 4.7 Test result based on II estimation, full sample against sub-sample 
VARX(1) Subsets Full Sample Sub Sample 
1 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅 21.17 
(1.01) 
22.77 
(1.34) 
2 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝑅 29.73 
(1.55) 
29.73 
(1.94) 
3 𝑌, 𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑅 28.96 
(1.73) 
35.57 
(2.33) 
†TMD t statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Fisher debt deflation effect 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, more recent papers suggest that the inflation response to shocks 
can have powerful debt deflation effects when debt contracts are denominated in nominal terms. 
Christiano et al (2010) and von Heideken (2009) suggest that when debt contracts are 
denominated in nominal terms there are two factors which impact the cost of entrepreneurs’ 
borrowing; first the cost of borrowing fluctuates with the flow of entrepreneurial earnings and 
through capital gains and losses on entrepreneurial assets. This is the standard channel 
highlighted in BGG which tends to magnify the economic impact of a shock that affects 
economic activity. But they also highlight a second mechanism where entrepreneurs’ 
obligation to pay debt varies because inflation can ex post alter the real burden of debt. This 
second effect is referred to as a ‘Fisher debt deflation’ impact. Christiano et al. (2010) 
suggested that the Fisher debt deflation effect and pure accelerator mechanisms tend to 
reinforce each other, in the case if certain shocks move the price level and output in the same 
directions, but tend to be offsetting each other, in the case if shocks move the price level and 
output in opposite directions. Furthermore, for estimation result, they reject models without a 
Fisher deflation effect in favour of models that include them.  
Recall the equation (3.39): 𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1] = 𝐸𝑡 [𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. )𝑅𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
] , with ‘Fisher debt deflation 
effect’, now the debt contract is re-specified in terms of the nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡: 
𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1] = 𝐸𝑡[𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. )𝑅𝑡]                                              (4.23) 
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The version of the model with ‘Fisher debt deflation effect’ retains all the channels of 
transmission, which are embodied in the model discussed in Chapter 3. Together with equation 
(3.40), the external finance premium now reads: 
𝐸𝑡[𝐸𝑃𝑡+1(. )] =
𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑌𝑡+1]
𝑅𝑡
= 𝜀𝑡
𝑒𝑝𝑟 (
𝑃𝑡
𝑘𝐾𝑡+1
𝑁𝑊𝑡+1
)
𝜒
                          (4.24) 
We can also derive the log linearized equation as: 
𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜒(𝑞𝑞𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡 − 𝑛𝑤𝑡) + 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡                              (4.25) 
 
Figure 4.18 illustrates a productivity shock drives output and inflation in the different directions, 
since the response of capital price is larger in the SWBGG Model than it is when it includes 
the Fisher deflation effect (red dotted line). The responses of capital, investment and output in 
SWBGG are also comparatively larger. On the other hand, when a monetary policy shock hits 
the economy shown in Figure 4.19, it raises the nominal interest while decreases the output and 
inflation in a same direction. The response of capital and then investment and output is smaller 
than that of the model with fisher deflation effect. The IRFs is then in line with the conclusion 
of Christiano et al. (2010). However, when we continue to test this alternative model using the 
estimated coefficients from baseline SWBGG model (when fisher effect shut down), it does 
not surprisingly result to a strong rejection (although subset 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅 is close to a non-rejection 
critical level). Therefore, in order to match the dynamic properties of overserved variables by 
coping an extra Fisher deflation effect, we should re-estimate the model.  
 
Table 4.8  TMD t-Test Result Based On II Estimation, Nominal Debt Deflation Effect 
VARX(1) Subsets SWBGG SWBGG 
Fisher deflation effect 
1 𝑌, 𝜋, 𝑅  1.01  1.80 
2 𝑌, 𝑄, 𝑅  1.55 3.01 
3 𝑌, 𝐸𝐹𝑃, 𝑅  1.73  3.40 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, we evaluate a medium sized DSGE model incorporating with financial friction 
and open economy setting that described in Chapter 3, to re-examine whether the calibrated 
structural parameter can fit the observed data. Instead of detrending the series, we estimate and 
evaluate the model using non-stationary data by indirect Inference method. We find models 
with and without the existence of financial frictions do not pass the Indirect Inference test using 
original calibrated parameters. We therefore search for set of parameters that fit the data best 
under the criteria of test, and use the set of parameters as the estimated one. The exploration of 
the drivers of the variability delivers the finding that financial shocks play a mixed role. In 
particular, they are the main driver of the variances in financial variables, investment. They 
play a fairly significant role as the driver of nominal interest rate and investment.  However, 
they play less important roles as drivers of fluctuations for other variables including output, 
consumption, and inflation. The result also affirms the irrelevance of the investment-specific 
technology shock as a dominate driver of the variability when financial shocks are involved.  
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Appendix 4.A Table and Figures 
 
Table 4.9 Variance decomposition of SW model for post-financial crisis episode: 2006Q1 to 2015Q4  
                  Variable 
Shocks 
Interest rate Inflation Consumption Output Ex. rate 
Government Residual 1.1 0.9 0.7 3.8 2.4 
Preference 1.2 0.3 18.5 1.9 3.7 
Investment 0.9 4.3 10.3 20.4 2.8 
Taylor rule 43.5 2.8 7.8 5.4 6.4 
Productivity 18.1 41.9 17.4 29.8 26.3 
Price mark up 10.3 35.7 3.9 2.8 1.0 
Wage mark up 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Labour supply 13.5 8.0 25.5 23.4 16.6 
Export 6.4 3.2 8.6 5.8 21.0 
Import 5.0 2.9 7.3 6.7 19.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 4.10 Variance decomposition of SWBGG model for post-financial crisis episode: 2006Q1 to 2015Q4  
                  Variable 
Shocks 
Interest rate Inflation EFP Consumption Output Ex. rate 
Government Residual 2.3 1.0 0.1 1.6 2.9 1.7 
Preference 0.1 0.1 0.0 13.3 1.6 0.9 
Investment 3.8 3.1 11.5 2.7 3.1 2.1 
Taylor rule 32.3 2.2 0.6 6.6 4.8 3.2 
Productivity 15.6 39.1 6.9 20.6 27.7 21.3 
Price mark up 5.1 37.5 0.3 4.6 3.1 1.0 
Wage mark up 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Labour supply 15.6 7.8 2.6 30.1 26.9 16.9 
External premium 17.8 1.6 62.3 5.6 15.4 13 
Net worth 2.1 0.1 13.9 1.2 6.1 4.1 
Export 3.4 3.8 0.9 7.1 4.1 17.2 
Import 2.0 3.7 0.5 6.6 4.3 18.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Figure 4.3 IRFs to a productivity shock  
 
119 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4.4 IRFs to a monetary policy shock 
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Figure 4.5 IRFs to an investment specific shock 
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Figure 4.6 IRFs to an external finance premium shock 
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Figure 4.7   IRFs to an wage markup shock 
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Figure 4.8  IRFs to an export demand shock 
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Figure 4.9   Historical shock decomposition of Output  
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Figure 4.10    Historical shock decomposition Consumption 
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Figure 4.11   Historical shock decomposition Interest rate 
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Figure 4.12   Historical shock decomposition Inflation 
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Figure 4.13   Distribution of VARX (1) parameters of output, inflation and interest rate for SWBGG 
model based on calibration 
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Figure 4.14   Distribution of VARX (1) parameters of output, inflation and interest rate for SWBGG 
model based on II estimation 
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Figure 4.15   Distribution of VARX (1) parameters of Interest rate, external financial premium rate and 
exchange rate for SWBGG model based on II estimation 
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Figure 4.16   Simulations plot for selected endogenous variables  
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Figure 4.17    Actual data observed from 1975Q1 to 2015Q4 
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Figure 7.4.18 IRFs for a productivity shock with and without Fisher deflation effect 
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Figure 4.19   IRFs for a monetary shock with and without Fisher deflation effect 
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Appendix 4.B How to derive terminal condition  
The model is solved by the projection method following Fair and Taylor (1983) and Minford et al. 
(1984, 1986). The following is the process to find the terminal condition for forward looking variables 
used in Fortran. This method is based on Minford et al. (1979) that terminal conditions can be obtained 
from an equilibrium analysis of the model. Over a finite time period at terminal date 𝑇, we assume that  
𝑌𝑇−2 = 𝑌𝑇−1 = 𝐸𝑇−1𝑌𝑇 = ?̅?.  
where ?̅? =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?̅?
𝑖̅
𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅
?̅?
?̅?
?̅?
𝑐̅
?̅?
𝑙 ̅
𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅
𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅
𝑛𝑤̅̅ ̅̅
?̅?
?̅?
?̅? ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, is a vector of terminal values of all endogenous variables of the model.  
Recall the log-linearized model presented in Appendix, the steady state gives the following system 
equations. 
?̅? =
1
𝑐4
(𝑐1𝑐̅ + 𝑐2𝑐̅ − 𝑐4?̅? + 𝑐3(𝑙 ̅ − 𝑙)̅ − 𝑐̅ + 𝑒𝑏𝑡)  
𝑖̅ =
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
[𝑖̅ + 𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝑖̅ +
1
𝛾2𝜑
𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅] + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅ =
1−𝛿
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅ +
𝑅𝐾
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅ − 𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅  
?̅? = (
1−𝛿
𝛾
) ?̅? + (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) 𝑖̅ + (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) ((1 + 𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐))𝛾2𝜑) 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
?̅? =
1
𝑟𝑝
[
1
(1−𝜌)
(?̅? − 𝜌?̅? + 𝑟∆𝑦(?̅? − ?̅?) + 𝑒𝑟𝑡) − 𝑟𝑦?̅?]  
?̅? = 𝑤𝑤 (
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
?̅? +
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
?̅? +
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
?̅? −
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
?̅? −
𝜄𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
?̅? −
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝜖𝑤)
) (?̅?−𝜎𝑙𝑙 ̅ − (
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
) (𝑐̅ −
ℎ
𝛾
𝑐̅)) + 𝑒𝑤𝑡) + (1 − 𝑤
𝑤) (𝜎𝑙𝑙 ̅ − (
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
) (𝑐̅ −
ℎ
𝛾
𝑐̅) −
(?̅? − ?̅?) + 𝑒𝑤𝑡
𝑠)  
𝑐̅ =
𝑦
𝑐
(?̅? −
𝑖
𝑦
𝑖̅ −
𝑘
𝑦
𝑅𝐾𝑧̅ −
𝑐𝑒
𝑦
𝑐𝑒̅̅̅ −
𝑥
𝑦
?̅? +
𝑚
𝑦
?̅? − 𝑒𝑔𝑡)  
?̅? = 𝜙[𝛼𝑘𝑠̅̅ ̅ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑙 ̅ + 𝑒𝑎𝑡]  
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𝑙 ̅ = −?̅? + (1 +
1−𝜓
𝜓
) 𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅ + ?̅?  
𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅ = 𝑤𝑝 (
1
𝛼(1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝)(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)
[?̅? −
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
?̅? +
𝜄𝑝
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
?̅? +
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
) (𝛼𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅ + (1 − 𝛼)?̅? − 𝑒𝑎𝑡) − 𝑒𝑝𝑡]) + (1 − 𝑤
𝑝)(−
1−𝛼
𝛼
?̅? +
𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝛼
)   
𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅ = 𝜒(𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅ + ?̅? − 𝑛𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ?̅? − ?̅? + 𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡  
𝑛𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ =  𝜃𝑛𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ +
𝑘
𝑛𝑤
(𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅ − 𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅) + 𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅ + 𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑡  
?̅? = 𝑐𝑓̅̅ ̅ + 𝜎𝑓?̅? + 𝑒𝑥𝑡  
?̅? = 𝑐̅ − 𝜎?̅? + 𝑒𝑚𝑡  
?̅? =
𝑦
𝑥
(−
𝑥
𝑦
?̅? +
𝑚
𝑦
?̅? − 𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅ · 𝑏𝑓𝑡−1)  
 
We express the system equations as Matrix form reads: 
?̅? = 𝐴?̅? + 𝐵𝑍𝑡  
 
where ?̅? =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?̅?
𝑖̅
𝑝𝑘̅̅ ̅
?̅?
?̅?
?̅?
𝑐̅
?̅?
𝑙 ̅
𝑟𝑘̅̅ ̅
𝑐𝑦̅̅ ̅
𝑛𝑤̅̅ ̅̅
?̅?
?̅?
?̅? ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       𝑍𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑤𝑡
𝑒𝑤𝑡
𝑠
𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑒𝑔𝑡
𝑒𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑒𝑚𝑡
𝑏𝑓𝑡−1]
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𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 𝑎𝑐 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1
1
𝛾2𝜑
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
1−𝛿
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
0 0 0 0 0 0
𝑅𝐾
1−𝛿+𝑅𝐾
−1 0 0 0 0
0 (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) 0 (
1−𝛿
𝛾
) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
𝑟𝑝
(
1
(1−𝜌)
− 𝜌) 0 0 0 0 0 0 −
𝑟𝑦
𝑟𝑝
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 𝑓𝜋 𝑓𝑤 𝑓𝑐 0 𝑓𝑙 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −
𝑖
𝑐
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝑘
𝑐
𝑅𝐾 0 −
𝑐𝑒
𝑐
−
𝑥
𝑐
𝑚
𝑐
0
0 0 𝜙𝛼 0 0 0 0 0 𝜙(1 − 𝛼) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 1 +
1−𝜓
𝜓
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 𝑗𝜋 𝑗𝑤 0 0 0 𝑗𝑟𝑘 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 𝜒 𝜒 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝜒 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 𝜃 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝜎𝑓
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝜎
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
𝑚
𝑥
 
    ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
𝑎𝑐 =
1
𝑐4
(𝑐1 + 𝑐2 − 𝑐4 − 1)  
𝑓𝜋 = 𝑤
𝑤 (
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)−1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑤−𝜄𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
)  
𝑓𝑤 = 𝑤
𝑤 (1 −
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝜖𝑤)
))  
𝑓𝑐 = 𝑤
𝑤 (
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝜖𝑤)
) (−
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
(1 −
ℎ
𝛾
))) + (1 − 𝑤𝑤) (−(
1
1−
ℎ
𝛾
) (1 −
ℎ
𝛾
))  
𝑓𝑙 = 𝑤
𝑤 (
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝜖𝑤)
) (−𝜎𝑙)) + (1 − 𝑤
𝑤)𝜎𝑙  
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𝑗𝜋 =
𝑤𝑝(1−
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)+𝜄𝑝
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
)
𝛼(1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝)(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)
  
𝑗𝑟𝑘 =
𝑤𝑝(1−
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)+𝜄𝑝
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
)
𝛼(1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝)(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)
(
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
))  
𝑗𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑤𝑝(1−
𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)+𝜄𝑝
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
)
𝛼(1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝)(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)
(
1
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)) − (1 − 𝛼)
(1−𝑤𝑝)
𝛼
  
 
𝐵 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
𝑐4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 𝑜𝑘 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 𝑚𝑤 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 (1 − 𝑤𝑤) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝜙 0 𝑛𝑟𝑘 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝑡𝑟𝑘 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1
𝑟𝑝(1−𝜌)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
𝑜𝑘 = (1 −
1−𝛿
𝛾
) ((1 + 𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐))𝛾2𝜑)  
𝑚𝑤 = −
𝑤𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑤)(1−𝜉𝑤)
𝜉𝑤(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝜖𝑤)
)  
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𝑛𝑟𝑘 =
𝑤𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
) +
(1−𝑤𝑤)
𝛼
  
𝑡𝑟𝑘 = −
𝑤𝑤
1+𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜄𝑝
(
(1−𝛽𝛾(1−𝜎𝑐)𝜉𝑝)(1−𝜉𝑝)
𝜉𝑝(1+(𝛷𝑝−1)𝑒𝑝)
)  
 
This gives, after rearranging the equation: 
 𝐼?̅? − 𝐴?̅? = 𝐵𝑍𝑡  => ?̅? = (
1
𝐼−𝐴
)𝐵𝑍𝑡  
It verifies at terminal date 𝑇, all endogenous variable values can be expressed as a function of values of 
error processes. In the model, productivity 𝑒𝑎𝑡  and foreign net assets over GDP ratio  𝑏𝑓𝑡−1  are 
considered as the two unit-root processes drive the non-stationarity property, while other error processes 
would be zero at 𝑇. Hence, we only interested that how endogenous variables are affected by 𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 
𝑏𝑓𝑡−1. We then write the expression in Fortran for solving the model.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The motivation behind my research is related to the recent banking crisis. DSGE models with 
sticky prices and wages are not just attractive from a theoretical perspective, but they are also 
emerging as useful tools for forecasting and quantitative policy analysis in macroeconomics 
(Del Negro et al, 2005). However, these macroeconomic models have come under severe 
criticism for failing to predict the crisis. It is then important during the time of disruption of the 
financial markets, to know about the dynamic properties of the variables pertaining to those 
markets and discover how far the banking crisis have been caused by financial shocks.  
At its core, this thesis follows the approach of the financial accelerator mechanism à la BGG 
(1999) reviewed in Chapter 2 and attempts to quantify the role of such frictions in business 
cycle fluctuations by estimating a DSGE model with using an Indirect Inference approach 
against the non-stationary data in Chapter 3 and 4. I base my analysis on a New Keynesian 
DSGE which closely follows the structure of the model developed by SW (2003, 2007), with 
the addition of the financial accelerator mechanism. The model is adjusted for Armington 
(1969) version small open economy with certain features according to Meenagh et al (2007) 
and Le et al (2009), and the model will adopt the setting from Le et al (2011) model that 
introduced the price and wage setting equation with a hybrid model: a weighted average of the 
New Classical flexible price and wage and New Keynesian nominal rigidity with Calvo (1983) 
mechanism.   Further work in Chapter 4 lies in terms of fulfilling Kydland and Prescott (1982)’s 
original promise of integrating growth and business cycle theory. We evaluate and re-estimated 
model that can be successfully taken to non-detrended data which match both growth and 
business cycle features of the data at the same time following the approach developed by 
Meenagh et al (2012), and further used and assessed by Le et al (2012, 2013) and Minford 
(2015). It then highlights the role of the external finance external premium and its contribution 
to the last financial crisis.  
Overall, the model captures the counter cyclical feature of external finance premium proposed 
in most of the literatures. The IRF shows an increase of the external finance premium shock 
would lead to an increase in the cost of capital borrowing. It then drives a reduction of capital 
price immediately which consequently decreases the investment. The increasing in investment 
causes a decline of the total output. The capital reduction on the other hand, weakens the net 
worth of the entrepreneurs enhancing the external premium. This exacerbates the balance sheet 
effect. Moreover, the role of the financial accelerator is highly procyclical because it amplifies 
the positive effect of the cut of the interest rate and it worsens the outcome of a contractionary 
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monetary policy. Although it does not impede financial frictions from remaining an ingredient 
to model, External finance premium shocks on the financial sector do not play a dominate role 
in explaining a recession. Financial friction shocks only account for less than 22% of output 
fluctuation. This is a much less effect than that found in previous studies such as Christensen 
and Dib (2008) and De Graeve (2008). The main dominant effects are still coming from the 
non-financial shocks, in particular, the non-stationary productivity shock and the labour supply 
shock. The result is in line with the finding from le et al (2012, 2013) that crises or financial 
crises mostly result from non-financial shocks, while financial shocks will add an extra layer 
of recession. The authors further proved that by simulation, even without the banking sector 
the financial crisis can still be created by non-stationary shocks.  
Despite the progress made until serval challenges and extensions are still worth to investigate. 
The first novelty that could be added by banking sector friction in this framework. Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) explicitly model the financial intermediary as 
a source of financial frictions due to the agency problem between financial intermediaries and 
depositors that limits the amount of credit. Differing from the costly state verification problem 
as in BGG (1999), these model frameworks proposed the financial accelerator as an agency 
problem that introduces endogenous constraints on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratios. Gertler 
and Karadi (2011) also considered shocks to the net worth of private banks, who face BGG-
like financial frictions in raising funds.  
Secondly, in our contributions, we do not focus our attention on the problem of the zero lower 
bound of the interest rate. Since after the crisis and great recession, the notion of an effective 
lower bound on policy interest rates has become a concrete concern for monetary policy and 
the unconventional monetary policy is usually used in a context of liquidity trap. Fortunately, 
contributions like the ones proposed by Le et al., 2014 are evidences of this new promising 
direction. Their results suggested a Taylor rule for making monetary base respond to credit 
conditions could substantially enhance the economy’s stability. It combined with price-level 
and nominal GDP targeting rules for interest rates to stabilise the economy in further. The 
authors argued that with these rules for monetary control, aggressive and distortionary 
regulation of banks’ balance sheets as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) becomes redundant. The third novelty could be extending the model to a two or multi- 
country symmetric model frameworks such as de Walque et al (2005) or Le et al (2013). In 
general, we hope that exotic elements now will became standard features of the next generation 
of DSGE models. 
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